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1. Introduction 
 
David Lewis, Middlesex University  
Wim Vandekerckhove, University of Greenwich 
 
1. 1   THE INTERNATIONAL WHISTLEBLOWING RESEARCH NETWORK 
 
In June 2009 a conference was held at Middlesex University to mark the fact that whistleblowing 
legislation had been in force in the UK for a decade. This event included a public lecture and 
attracted delegates from a range of backgrounds, including academics, legal and management 
practitioners, trade unionists, whistleblowers and students. At the end of the conference the 
decision to establish an International Whistleblowing Research Network (IWRN) was taken. People 
can join this network simply by consenting to their email address being put on a list and used for 
distribution purposes. At the time of writing, October 2017, there are over 200 members of the 
network. The current convener of the network is David Lewis who can be contacted via 
d.b.lewis@mdx.ac.uk.  
Following the IWRN conferences in 2011, 2013 and 2015 two Ebooks ‘Whistleblowing and 
Democratic Values’ and ‘Developments in whistleblowing research 2015’ and a special issue of the 
E-Journal of International and Comparative Labour Studies were produced. Thus this Ebook, which 
uses material presented at the June 2017 IWRN conference held in Oslo, maintains the network’s 
tradition of disseminating papers relevant to research in the field. 
 
1.2 CHAPTER SUMMARIES 
 
In this Ebook the chapters are sequenced as follows. The first two chapters focus on various aspects 
of the Norwegian experience of whistleblowing, and the third chapter examines the gap in 
protection afforded to UN whistleblowers. The following two chapters look at the importance of 
culture both generally and in particular sectors, namely health and social care. The final chapter 
explores how trade unions might use their voice to engage in the whistleblowing process.  
In her chapter entitled Norwegian whistleblowing research: A case of Nordic exceptionalism?  Brita 
Bjørkelo discusses some experiences from Norwegian whistleblowing research in the past twenty 
years and how this seems to be both similar and different from other countries’ results. The so-
called ‘Norwegian uniqueness’ is discussed in the context of the notion of exceptionalism. She 
concludes that, although some Norwegian results may be exceptional, others are more diverse and 
in a way similar to findings from other countries. Thus the description ‘same but different’ may be 
appropriate.  
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In the chapter entitled Legal provisions and democracy: Freedom of expression and whistleblowing 
in Norwegian workplaces, Sissel Trygstad, Anne Mette Ødegård and Elin Svarstad observe that the 
right to speak out can be morally justified on the basis of two different but interrelated arguments: 
democracy and efficiency. From a comparative perspective, Norway offers one of the strongest 
protections for freedom of expression in Europe. This freedom is regulated by the Constitution as 
well as the Working Environment Act and applies to workers in both public and private sectors. Their 
chapter discusses how these laws operate in practice and explains how recent amendments seem 
not to have resulted in the changes intended by the legislators. 
In The UN whistleblowing protection gap: implications for governance, human rights and risk 
management Caroline Hunt - Matthes and Peter Anthony Gallo profile the challenges confronting 
the UN Ethics mechanisms charged with whistleblower protection in the period 2006-2016. They 
consider the evidence of the failure and tainted independence of these mechanisms and assert that 
they have resulted in declining numbers of UN staff claiming protection under the whistleblowing 
arrangements. Unsurprisingly, they conclude that this situation creates unnecessary risk for the UN. 
Using the title Enhancing whistleblower protection: ‘It’s all about the culture’, Stelios Andreadakis 
argues that emphasis needs to be given to corporate culture so that existing cultures of silence 
coupled with dismissal and retaliation practices are replaced by a new culture based on honesty, 
integrity and transparency. He asserts that only by changing the mind-set in the boardrooms of 
modern corporations will whistleblowing achieve its purpose as an effective accountability 
mechanism. Drawing inspiration from the UK Bribery Act 2010, he makes practical 
recommendations for this change of corporate culture to be initiated and for companies to be 
actively involved in this process. 
In her chapter entitled Denial and paradox: conundrums of whistleblowing and the need for a new 
style of leadership in health and social care, Angie Ash examines two conceptual conundrums – 
paradox and denial – found consistently in international whistleblowing research and outlines a 
model of ethical leadership to counter these. She develops a model of leadership in antithesis to 
Ludwig and Longenecker’s concept of the ‘Bathsheba Syndrome’ i.e where organisational leaders 
enjoy power and privilege that firewall them from exigencies and compromises subordinates 
routinely make, and which may result in dangerous organisational practices becoming normalised. 
Characteristics of an ‘Anti-Bathsheba’ model of leadership are proposed as the means by which 
paradox and denial in whistleblowing can be countered. 
Finally, Arron Phillips addresses the question How might Trade unions use their voice to engage in 
the whistleblowing process?  He asserts that, although there are some contextual differences, the 
voice mechanisms in the UK, Norway and The Netherlands are comparable. He concludes by 
suggesting how trade unions might use these mechanisms. At an individual level they can support 
whistleblowers with individual voice options. At regulator level they can work with organisations to 
improve understanding and conditions for whistleblowers and at public level they can use their 
voice to inform the wider community about the whistleblower’s particular concern or treatment. 
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1.3  CONTRIBUTORS 
 
Stelios Andreadakis joined the School of Law at Leicester University in July 2013 and took up his 
current post as a Senior Lecturer in Corporate and Financial Law at Brunel University in 2017. His 
research interests are in the areas of Corporate Law and EU Law. Stelios’ current work focuses on 
the role of whistleblowers in modern corporate governance and he is conducting empirical research 
in the US, Japan and Europe.  
 
Angie Ash runs a health and social care research consultancy. Angie is a registered social worker 
who has worked with adults and children at risk of abuse and in charity sector management. Since 
1994, Angie has carried out research in health and social care for central and local government and 
NGOs , and has held research fellowships at the University of Bristol and Swansea University.  Angie 
has been involved in many investigations into failures of health and social care, and has published 
widely on the abuse and mistreatment of adults and children at risk.  
 
Brita Bjørkelo teaches on the Leadership and Management programmes at the Norwegian Police 
University College. She is involved in several research projects on whistleblowing and is also involved 
in investigations on ethical grey area police cases and ethical dilemmas among Senior Investigative 
Officers. Brita participates in projects on diversity in police education and organization and gender 
representation in top positions in academia. She also manages a project on Teacher Education, 
Ethics and Social Media. 
 
Peter Gallo is a qualified attorney admitted to practice law in three countries. Prior to joining the 
UN, he spent 19 years in Asia as an investigator in the private sector and was recognised as an expert 
on money laundering. In 2011, he joined the United Nations as an investigator in the Office of 
Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), Investigations Division in New York.  He left the UN after allowing 
his contract to expire in 2015 and later became an outspoken critic of the prejudice and corruption 
in OIOS, its ineffectiveness and its treatment of whistleblowers.  
 
Caroline Hunt-Matthes is a human rights lawyer and investigator by training and an Adjunct 
Professor in Labour Relations, Media Law, Corporate Governance, Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Managing Ethics and Diversity at Grenoble Business School, France and Webster University, 
Geneva. She served as a peacekeeper with the first UN Transitional Administration in the Former 
Yugoslavia and the pioneering UN human rights field mission to Rwanda in 1994.  Her experience as 
a UN whistleblower inspired her to conduct research in this field.  
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Anne Mette Ødegård is a political scientist from the University of Oslo (1999) and a business 
graduate from BI Norwegian Business School (1993). Before she started as a researcher at Fafo in 
2004, she worked as a journalist for more than 15 years.  
 
Anne Mette has been engaged in several projects concerning the working environment and the 
consequences of the EU-enlargement for the Norwegian labour market. Another research interest 
is labour market regulations, both on European and national level. The last four years she has also 
done research on whistleblowing at the workplace.   
 
Arron Phillips is a doctoral candidate at the University of Greenwich. His research involves a 
comparative study of trade unions and their role in the whistleblowing process. He has undertaken 
teaching in the areas of Business Ethics and Organisational Behaviour. Since completing his 
undergraduate degree in Law and a Master’s degree in Employment Law he has taken an active 
interest in researching various aspects of whistleblowing.  
 
Elin Svarstad has an MSc in Business and Economics and has been working at Fafo since 2016. Her 
main fields of research are the Nordic working life model, industrial relations and wage formation. 
She has participated in several projects related to whistleblowing and freedom of speech. 
 
Sissel C. Trygstad has a doctorate in Politics and became Director of Research at Fafo in 2015. She 
has worked there since 2004 and her research interests include part-time working, leadership and 
work organization as well as whistleblowing. She has attracted funding from many sources over the 
years and has published extensively in leading academic and practitioner journals. 
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2. Norwegian whistleblowing research: a case of Nordic 
exceptionalism? 
 
Brita Bjørkelo 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Since the 1990s descriptions about wrongdoing at work in Norwegian working life have been 
portrayed in scientific articles (van Wormer, 1990, 1995). This has drawn attention to the 
phenomenon whistleblowing itself as well as acted as calls for change within the areas where 
wrongdoing has been reported. Provisions relating to Norwegian private and public employees right 
to notify their employer regarding wrongdoing have been active since 2007 (Lewis & Trygstad, 
2009), and in November 2016 an expert group was appointed to address and evaluate the current 
state of whistleblowing legislation and the application of these (Eriksen, 2017). Studies have pointed 
to the uniqueness of Norwegian results in regard to more whistleblowing and less retaliation than 
found in other nations (Bjørkelo et al, 2011; Skivenes & Trygstad, 2010, 2017). This chapter discusses 
some of the experiences from Norwegian whistleblowing research in the past twenty years and how 
this seems to be similar and different from other nations’ results. The 'Norwegian uniqueness' is 
discussed in the context of the notion of exceptionalism. In sum, although some Norwegian results 
may be exceptional, others are more diverse, and in a way more similar to findings from other 
nations. Thus the description ‘same but different’ may be appropriate. 
 
2.1 WHISTLEBLOWING IN NORWAY 
 
In 1995, Katherine van Wormer published what may have been the first scientific article that applied 
the term whistleblowing on wrongdoing from a Norwegian context. Van Wormer had previously 
worked in a private Norwegian treatment centre on alcoholism in Norway and the wrongdoing 
concerned the treatment itself as well as issues relating to leadership and administration (van 
Wormer, 1995). Van Wormer also emphasised a need for regulation. At the time of van Wormer’s 
article being published in an international journal, the term whistleblowing had not yet developed 
in Norwegian language. However, since then the term has been applied in the media coverage of 
cases that have become publicly known and in scientific articles. Most Norwegian whistleblowing 
cases have begun as internal reports to the employees’ line manager (Bjørkelo et al, 2011), as is 
common for whistleblowing cases in general (Miceli et al, 2008).  
When the Norwegian Work Environment Act (WEA) 1977 was revised, new sections on 
whistleblowing were added, and these became active in 2007 (Lewis & Trygstad, 2009). The 
whistleblowing sections were developed from every individual’s right to freedom of speech which 
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is a part of the Norwegian constitution (§ 100).1 The WEA thus describes the limitations of this right 
that exist when an individual is employed by a Norwegian private or public organisation. Despite 
these rights, some Norwegian legal experts argue that the provisions are limiting, as they blur the 
link to the constitutional right to freedom of speech. 
 
2.2 NORWAY AS UNIQUE 
 
As described by van Wormer in the 1990s, lack of regulation could hinder development of secure, 
legal and ethical treatment conditions for patients in Norwegian private drug treatment facilities. 
Even though statutory provisions 'required employees to report wrongdoings in the organizations 
since 1956, when the provision of safety representatives was incorporated in the Norwegian 
Environment Act' (Skivenes & Trygstad, 2017), the WEA from 2007 required employers to have 
procedures for reporting wrongdoing at Norwegian workplaces. Studies published after the 
implementation of the WEA, with data collected before and after the implementation, have found 
that the frequency of observing wrongdoing varies (see e.g. Skivenes & Trygstad, 2010: 1075; 
Trygstad & Ødegård, 2016: 33), the frequency of intending (or attitude towards reporting) varies 
(see e.g. Malmedal et al, 2009: 746-748; Skivenes & Trygstad, 2013), the same adheres to actual 
reporting (see e.g. Bjørkelo et al, 2011; Skivenes & Trygstad, 2015), and most quantitative studies 
show that whistleblowers are not retaliated against and are effective (see e.g. Bjørkelo, 2010; 
Matthiesen et al, 2008; Skivenes & Trygstad, 2017; Trygstad and Ødegård, 2016). 
Norwegian findings, for example that there are many whistleblowers and that they are less likely to 
experience retaliation, may be interpreted as relating to the Norwegian working life model and the 
strength of institutional arrangements (see e.g. Skivenes & Trygstad, 2017). The notion of 
exceptionalism is associated with the work by e.g. Pratt (2008), Lappi-Seppälä (2007) and Savelsberg 
(1994) and ‘Nordic exceptionalism’ has been used to describe the treatment of prison inmates in 
the Nordic countries as humane and welfare-oriented compared to elsewhere (see e.g. Helgesen, 
2015). In Pratt’s (2008) work, the description of Norwegian exceptionalism is for instance based on 
factors such as: egalitarianism, next to no immigration, religious homogeneity, inclusiveness and 
solidarity, and a focus on what citizens are allowed to do as opposed to the penalties for illegal 
actions. Further, exceptionalism is associated with the welfare model which according to Pratt 
(2008) most likely will ensure that 'there would be no stigma attached to being a welfare beneficiary; 
nor would anybody be excluded from the assistance it provided' (p. 127). 
 
2.3 NORWAY AS DIVERSE 
 
At the same time, employees that report wrongdoing at work report more bullying at work than 
other employees and worst-case scenarios are similar to descriptions and findings from other parts 
of the world (Bjørkelo, 2013; Bjørkelo et al, 2011; Bjørkelo et al, 2015). Preliminary findings from a 
                                                 
1 https://www.stortinget.no/globalassets/pdf/english/constitutionenglish.pdf 
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longitudinal study with three measurement points (2005, 2007 and 2010) show that whistleblowers 
at one point in time report significantly higher levels, that is, more exposure to systematic negative 
behaviors than other employees at two later points in chronologic time (Bjørkelo et al, 2015). 
However, the preliminary results also show that new whistleblowing may be predicted by previous 
exposure to bullying at work (Bjørkelo et al, 2015). This may imply that there are two different 
groups and processes going on. 
This particular study defined whistleblowing in a way that excludes reporting about wrongdoing 
that relates to him/herself, such as e.g., self- experienced sexual harassment or bullying, which 
opens up for diverse interpretations. It may be that in some cases, an employee observes or learns 
about wrongdoing in the form of bullying/harassment of other employees. In this respect s/he 
goes from being an observer or bystander to a whistleblower, and is then only later him/herself 
exposed to workplace bullying (Bjørkelo, 2017). Another situation may be that an employee that 
him/herself is exposed to workplace bullying blows the whistle on another workplace wrongdoing 
that harms someone else, and that this employee again becomes the recipient of re-exposure to 
bullying, as a result of the whistleblowing (Bjørkelo, 2017). It may thus be the case that pre- and 
post-exposure to workplace bullying may relate to different causes and consequences in relation 
to whistleblowing. 
All while most self-reported quantitative results on the consequences after whistleblowing show 
that most employees not retaliated again and are effective. Qualitative results describe the impact 
of job loss, the stigma of association of even being seen as a friend or an associate of a current or 
previous employee that has reported about wrongdoing at work has been described as for 
instance in the following manner: 
I realised I was kind of treated as if I was contagious or radioactive (...) People stiffened and 
some were lip talkers. Some were scared (...) I guess somebody had told them, that if you hang 
around him, he will report you, and you will get in trouble! (...) It is very unpleasant. Because 
you do not know what people have heard (...) and you cannot pick people randomly and say: 
listen! I will tell you what this is really about. (Bjørkelo et al, 2008: 28). 
Some ten years after the law was implemented, few employees seem to have success in the legal 
system (Eriksen & Bjørkelo, 2014). One of the core issues seems to be the difficulty of gaining 
understanding for the link between the reported wrongdoing and the later negative reactions 
(Arntzen de Besche, 2013). In addition, a national representative study found that since 2010, fewer 
Norwegian employees seem to achieve changes based on their whistleblowing, more seem to 
receive negative reactions, fewer are willing to report wrongdoing again, and more argue that they 
stay silent due to fear of negative reactions (Trygstad & Ødegård, 2016).  
 
2.4 ISSUES OF INTEREST 
 
An issue of interest is how retaliation rates are different depending on the sample applied, which is 
a shared empirical challenge across nations. According to Miceli and Near: 'Nowhere is this problem 
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better illustrated than in current research on retaliation, where research results based on non-
random samples suggest that a large majority of whistle-blowers suffer retaliation, whereas 
research findings based on random samples indicate just the opposite' (Miceli & Near, 2007). Thus, 
retaliation rates based on national representative studies are often low (Bjørkelo et al, 2011; 
Skivenes & Trygstad, 2010) while retaliation rates based on severe and often external 
whistleblowing cases are often high and potentially as severe as including symptoms associated with 
post-traumatic stress (Bjørkelo et al, 2008).  
A study of Norwegian citizens attempted to link these portraits together (see e.g. Matthiesen et al, 
2008). The study applied a random and representative sample of 7000 Norwegian citizens in the age 
span of 20-67 years and the criterion for inclusion was to have been a former or current employee 
with some level of tenure (see also Matthiesen, 2016). Preliminary findings suggest that employees 
that had reported wrongdoing and were still employed experienced similar negative consequences 
but to a lesser extent, than whistleblowers outside working life (Bjørkelo et al, Under progress). 
Dworkin and Baucus (1998) found similar trends when investigating the experiences of internal and 
external whistleblowers respectively. 
Several Norwegian whistleblowing cases based in the public sector domain (e.g., police, nursing, 
bureaucracy) have had an impact on public discourse regarding public sector leadership, allocation 
of economic means and evaluations of how this may impact actual professional work. In Norway, 
one of the most publicly known cases have been the reporting of an alleged suicide of a young child 
(see e.g. Johannessen, 2015; Schaefer, 2015). After a long process, and many internal and external 
efforts to draw attention to the perceived wrongdoing, the mother’s previous cohabitant was 
sentenced to 18 years detention with a minimum term of ten years for the murder of the eight year 
old girl Monika.2  
The duty to report is something that is shared by many occupations and is regulated in different 
parts of the Norwegian legislation. In professions such as health care, the awareness and role of 
safety culture has increasingly been acknowledged and seems to be applied in practice to some 
extent. Thus, even though legally divided, these two actions, duty reporting and whistleblowing, are 
not completely different as phenomena. Several of the Norwegian most publicly known 
whistleblowing cases concerned public or private sector corruption, health care and/or cases of 
human rights and were voiced by professional workers employed in the police, schools, health care, 
as well as lawyers, auditors, and financial directors. These employees reported due to their role and 
prescribed duty and still seem to describe similar reactions as described among external 
whistleblowers elsewhere. 
  
2.5 NORWEGIAN UNIQUENESS SEEN THROUGH THE LENSES OF EXCEPTIONALISM 
 
At the core of exceptionalism lie the institutionalised social democratic values (Pratt, 2008). Another 
corner stone is the emphasis of private (and public) companies not working only 'to profit their 
                                                 
2 http://norwaytoday.info/news/18-years-detention-monika-case-2/  
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members' but also 'to fulfil the ends of society' (Pratt, 2008: 129). Whistleblowing is behaviour and 
practice that tests these values in a society. Having regulations in place is one thing. How a society 
handles whistleblowing cases in practice is another (see e.g. Senekal & Uys, 2013). This is not to 
underscore that 'institutional arrangements really matter' (p. 325) in that 'having a procedure and 
following it lead to better outcomes for both employers and whistleblowers' (Lewis et al, 2015). It 
is therefore of utmost importance to study successful whistleblowing, whether this is due to 
exceptionalism or not. Studies into why whistleblowing has had an effect may aid organizations in 
stopping wrongdoing at work, help observers to evaluate the likelihood of their own potential 
effectiveness as well as encourage valid whistleblowing (Van Scotter et al, 2005). 
Norwegian findings may be due to a form of exceptionalism and a result of highly egalitarian cultural 
values and social structures. Due to institutionalised structures in the welfare state, this may bring 
understanding and explanations as to high reporting rates and low retaliation rates. Norway has a 
law that includes both private and public employees, it has strong unions, a well-founded and 
structured labour market model and many formal whistleblowers (Skivenes & Trygstad, 2017). Still, 
in relation to results concerning individual and institutional power, studies has shown that even 
though procedures are in place (36 %) or being prepared (5 %), many have none (31 %) or may be 
unaware of the provisions (27 %, Skivenes & Trygstad, 2017). Further, a minority (17 %) report to 
have applied them in practice. Middle managers s more than others seem to stay silent out of fear 
of reprisals, female employees are more likely to be retaliated against and even though to a greater 
extent bigger institutions have procedures, they report less effective whistleblowing (Skivenes & 
Trygstad, 2017). Thus, a range of studies show that there is a lot of formal whistleblowing in Norway 
in that being a manager or union representative is related to reporting wrongdoing at work (Bjørkelo 
et al, 2011). It may thus seem that most whistleblowing goes through formal channels owing to a 
strong working life model and institutional arrangements. In other words, there seems to be less 
whistleblowing from Norwegian employees without any formal or non-duty of reporting other roles. 
In one of the studies that excluded reporting though established channels or about wrongdoing 
directed at him/herself, the reporting rate was 12 % (Bjørkelo et al, 2011).  
 
2.6 A CASE OF SAME BUT DIFFERENT? 
 
Empirical Norwegian results on whistleblowing portray a form of uniqueness as well as they add 
some diversity among them. In a study that compared whistleblowing results from the US, Australia 
and Norway, the authors stated that  
Despite differences […] across the studies […] a) a large group of employees observed 
wrongdoing in each of the organisations studied, although the rate of observation varied 
dramatically; b) a large group of the employees who observed wrongdoing reported it 
internally or externally, but it was often below 50%; c) a large group of employees who blew 
the whistle also perceived that they suffered reprisal as a direct result for doing so; again, 
however, this was always less than 50% of the whistle-blowers (Miceli & Near, 2013: 443).  
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Exceptionalism in terms of welfare state, e.g., the role of formalisation of democratic rights may 
very well play a part in the interpretation of Norwegian results (Skivenes and Trygstad, 2017), 
especially when compared to, for instance India, (see e.g. D’Cruz & Bjørkelo, 2016).  
If there is agreement across nations, it is most likely on issues such as the need for laws, regulations, 
ethical guidelines and whistleblowing procedures, along with the recognition that these, in 
themselves, not predict actual practice even though they may be of vital help (see e.g. Lewis et al, 
2015; Senekal & Uys, 2013). Thus even though regulations across the world expand; reporting 
through established procedures may also be associated with negative consequences. In one of the 
most publicly known Norwegian whistleblowing cases, the starting point for the employee that 
reported was being asked to sign the internal ethical guidelines that were being introduced in the 
Norwegian part of an international company he worked for at the time.3  
According to previous Norwegian studies it seems that it is easier to agree upon wrongdoing in the 
form of corruption ('numbers') more than experiences (see e.g. Bjørkelo et al, 2011; Skivenes & 
Trygstad, 2013). Applying exceptionalism as a theoretical framework for understanding and 
explaining Norwegian whistleblowing results; it may be assumed that there are more reports about, 
for instance, questionable financial investments and that these reports are more acted on in Norway 
than elsewhere. Still, some of the most officially known cases in Norway concerned numbers and 
the interpretation of the law in regulating the alleged types of wrongdoing. In one of these, the 
Terra case, Ingvar Linde, a municipality accountant reported about the alleged illegality of 
investments made by a Norwegian municipality. After a long process, including notifying the highest 
levels of political leadership, eight ‘municipalities lost €137.5M, after having invested in complex 
financial products that plunged when the financial crisis set in’ (Gårseth-Nesbakk & Kjærland, 2016). 
The societal consequences of the investments were dramatic.4 In another cases, Siemens Business 
Services (SBS) were acquitted for intentional major fraud of 60 mill NOK and repaid 75 mill NOK to 
the Norwegian Armed Forces (Johnsen, 2011). The verdict was not appealed by the Norwegian 
National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime 
(Johnsen, 2011).  
Johnstone has described 'Denmark’s apparent success at controlling corruption' as 'both real and 
more complex than it may appear' (Johnston, 2013). An analysis of a number of Norwegian role-
prescribed whistleblowing and audit cases reported that 'it seems as though these individuals were 
heard only after contacting the press' and points to the importance of the media as 'societal 
watchdogs' in Norway (Warhuus, 2011). Analyses of Norwegian corruption cases, the discourse and 
interplay between the media and the cases themselves, have found the cases to be linked both to 
allegations of corruption and also to 'wider social and political tensions' as well as illuminating 
ideological, social and cultural norms (Breit, 2011). 
 
                                                 
3 See e.g., http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/bribe/2009/02/portrait-of-a-whistleblower.htmlIt  
4 See e.g., https://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/jun/30/subprimecrisis.creditcrunch  
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2.7 CLOSING IN AND SUMMING UP 
 
Van Wormer’s work from Norway raised national debate about and eventually potentially led to 
regulation in the Norwegian social work profession. It may very well be that the effect the report 
had was related to having reported the wrongdoing in a welfare state and the fact that she was 
supported by institutional rights, in that the professional Norwegian union for social work supported 
her. Van Wormer, who also was an external whistleblower, was exposed to retaliation. Even though 
her efforts in the beginning were related to supporting other members of the staff, she eventually 
went public about the perceived wrongdoing. The negative consequences followed in the form of, 
for instance, denied monetary support for herself and her family to return to the US, which had 
previously been agreed.  
Summing up the Norwegian findings, most quantitative studies show that whistleblowers are not 
retaliated against and are effective, the frequency of observing wrongdoing varies, the frequency of 
intending (or attitude towards reporting) varies, and the same adheres to actual reporting. There 
are also many formal whistleblowers, and as a result, much potential role-prescribed 
whistleblowing. Health care workers and other public employees are and may be prescribed to 
report wrongdoing as a part of their professional role. In the first Norwegian studies, data were 
primarily based on employees from such sectors, for instance nurses (see e.g. Hetle, 2004; Skivenes 
& Trygstad, 2005). Studies that have applied definitions where role-prescribed and self-reporting 
about wrongdoing directed at oneself has been excluded as whistleblowing, have found lower levels 
of reporting along with associations with workplace bullying and lower job satisfaction (Bjørkelo et 
al, 2011). Further, few Norwegian employees have won in a court of law, and when some have won, 
they may simultaneously have been responsible for costs and become losers in financial terms. As 
one publicly known Norwegian whistleblower described it, you may be a hero but that does not 
necessarily provide you with a job with a stable income. Thus, although there may be some form of 
Norwegian exceptionalism, there may also be a case of same but different. 
 
2.8 THE WAY FORWARD: WHISTLEBLOWING SEEN THROUGH THE LENSES OF NORDIC 
EXCEPTIONALISM 
 
According to Bjørkelo and Madsen (2013), the call for more strategy documents and guidelines, as 
parts of the neo-liberal ideology and New Public Management (NPM), may facilitate as well as 
hinder whistleblowing. Others have discussed how whistleblowing may be seen as a form of 
subversive action, both benign and malign (Olsson, 2016). Despite being framed within the Nordic 
working life model, organizational critique in the form of whistleblowing is a phenomenon that not 
necessarily has had an easy way into the tripartite cooperation (Trygstad, 2017). In further research, 
exceptionalism as an explanatory factor for whistleblowing may thus be expanded to investigate 
how and whether institutionalised possibilities of welfare states in the Nordic region in fact do 
provide other rates and conditions for whistleblowing than elsewhere. Investigations may include 
going into existing as well as initiating more comparative Scandinavian and Nordic whistleblowing 
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research. This includes examining related phenomena such as the work on critique (see e.g. Plessis, 
2015; Sørensen, 2015; Willig, 2016), work on different forms of loyalty (see e.g. Ahlstrand et al, 
2017; Arvidson & Axelsson, 2014; Börnfelt et al, 2014) as well as work on whistleblowing (see e.g. 
Gottschalk & Holgersson, 2011; Hedin & Månsson, 2008, 2012; Hedin et al, 2008; Kjöller, 2016; 
Wieslander, 2016). Johnstone has described 'Denmark’s apparent success at controlling corruption' 
as 'both real and more complex than it may appear' (Johnston, 2013) and du Plessis (2014) describes 
Danish research on whistleblowing and whistleblowing procedures as scarce (see e.g. Bjørkelo & 
Høgh, 2013; Sienknecht, 2010). 
Further, a Finnish thesis emphasised that an 'auditor’s reporting duties to authorities should be 
limited to exceptions' and discourage general reporting rules (Reiman, 2017). Another way to 
investigate the assumption of exceptionalism as a way to explain and understand whistleblowing in 
a Scandinavian and Nordic context is through role-prescribed whistleblowing. High reporting levels 
may be due to most reporting being channeled through institutional roles, in the form of formal 
leaders and employee representatives. In these ways, exceptionalism may provide a lens to both 
extend further comparative investigations as well as provide alternative ways to interpret 
Norwegian whistleblowing results. 
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3. Legal provisions and democracy: freedom of expression and 
whistleblowing in Norwegian workplaces.  
 
Sissel C. Trygstad, Anne Mette Ødegård & Elin Svarstad  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The right to speak out can be morally justified on the basis of two different but interrelated 
arguments: democracy and efficiency. From a comparative perspective, Norway offers one of the 
strongest protections for freedom of expression in Europe. This freedom is regulated by the 
Constitution as well as the Working Environment Act and applies to workers in both public and 
private sectors. This chapter discusses the practice of these laws at the workplace, and explains how 
recent amendments seem to have failed to bring about the changes intended by the legislators. 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Freedom of expression is a key element in democratic working life. Put simply, it is fundamentally a 
matter of the possibilities to take part in public debates related to one’s field of interests, to voice 
criticism and submit notification about concerns. From an employer’s point of view, there are 
several reasons for why ‘free speech’ should be appreciated. It is of great importance to acquire 
knowledge about waste, poor quality of services and products and corruption. Employees who 
speak out might provide fruitful information to employers about good and bad practices in the 
production process. It might also be argued that ‘free speech’ is closely linked to a good working 
environment in general (Kalleberg, 1983; Skivenes & Trygstad, 2007).  From the employees’ and the 
trade unions’ side, freedom of expression is a precondition for participation and co-decision at the 
workplace, which is a cornerstone in the Norwegian working life model. Patman is concerned with 
how participation promotes educational, intellectual and emotional development, and the 
workplace is seen as a key arena for training in politics and democracy (Patman, 1970, cited in 
Trygstad 2017).   
Employees’ freedom of expression has been strengthened during the last two decades and is 
regulated in the Norwegian Constitution and in the Norwegian Working Environment Act (WEA). In 
2004, amendments in Section 100 stated that it is attempts to limit employee’s freedom of 
expression that needs to be justified, not the other way around. Three years later, the Working 
Environment Act (WEA) introduced new provisions to promote whistleblowing and protect 
employees who blow the whistle. In the Norwegian Constitution, there is no clear line between 
voicing opinions and whistleblowing. In 2017 there were further amendments to the WEA on this 
topic: mandatory procedures (routines) for whistleblowing and protection also for sub-contracted 
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or temporary workers. The arguments for these provisions were linked to democracy in general and 
freedom of expression in particular.  
In this chapter we elaborate the effects that the amendments in the Constitution (2004) and the 
Working Environment Act (2004) may have had when it comes to the perceived opportunities for 
employees to participate in public debates, voice criticism in public and to blow the whistle. The 
legal changes got a lot of publicity, and issues related to retaliation for using voice whistleblowing 
is hot news in Norway. In this chapter we ask:  
• To what extent is it unproblematic for employees to raise opinions outside the workplace?  
• Have the changes in the WEA made it easier and safer to blow the whistle for Norwegian 
employees?  
In the next section (section 3.2) we present the legal changes and how these changes were received 
by different actors. In section 3.3 we comment on the methodology in use, before we present our 
findings in section 3.4. We discuss and conclude in section 3.5.  
 
3.2 THE LEGAL CHANGES 
 
The changes in the Constitution and in the WEA did not represent something entirely new; it is fairer 
to say that they strengthened the already existing rules and practices embedded in Norwegian 
working life. The statutory provisions introduced in 2007 can be traced back to 1956, when the 
provision on safety representatives was incorporated into the Norwegian Environment Act 
(Skivenes & Trygstad, 2015). These representatives have a special responsibility to report harmful 
conditions at the workplace and, in very dangerous situations are entitled to stop production. The 
existing provisions (also before 2007) in the Working Environment Act were and still are highly 
protective through such wording as ‘to secure a working environment that provides a basis for 
healthy and meaningful working situation that affords full safety from harmful physical and mental 
influences, and that has a standard of welfare at all times consistent with the level of technological 
and social development of society’ (WEA 2005, Section 1-1 A). As we will see later, the changes in 
the Working Environment Act were highly controversial.  
 
3.2.1 CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTION 
 
The general freedom of expression is protected by Section 100 in the Constitution and by Article 10 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In principle, employees enjoy the same 
freedom of expression as everybody else (Elvestad, 2011: 31). In the Norwegian Constitution, there 
is no clear line between voicing opinions and whistleblowing.  According to the changes in 2004, 
grounds must be provided for restricting employees freedom of expression. Moreover, the 
government White Paper (St. meld. nr. 26 (2003–2004): 14) states that employees are likely to have 
a special motivation to participate in public discourse because they might possess specialized 
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knowledge about the debated subjects. Furthermore, it is emphasized that freedom of expression 
is essential in light of the society’s need for information and open discourse. However, there are 
some limitations. Obviously, statements must not violate the employee’s statutory duty of 
confidentiality and as an employee you cannot speak on behalf of the employer. Further, managers   
are subject to stricter obligations of loyalty than non –managerial staff.. The same goes for 
employees in the public sector with positions close to the political sphere. Finally, statements must 
not violate employers’ legitimate interests in a significant way (Somb, case 2014/379). 
After the adoption of the amendments, the Parliamentary Ombudsman ascertained that Section 
100 of the Constitution provides stronger protection than the ECHR, and that the right of employees 
to free expression now accords with a direct interpretation of the Constitution. While the purpose 
of the new Section 100 was to strengthen the right of employees to free expression, the provisions 
on notification were introduced to protect employees against accusations of disloyalty (Trygstad, 
2017).  
 
3.2.2 CHANGES IN THE WEA – THE RIGHT TO NOTIFY 
 
The background for giving the right to notify on a statutory basis lies in the recognition that 
challenging people in power within an organization involves the risk of retaliation (Bakken & Dalby, 
2007; Bjørkelo, 2010; Brown et al., 2008; Skivenes &Trygstad, 2010). Employers and employees may 
have varying and contradictory interests, which can affect how notifications of censurable 
conditions are handled. This is the main reason for incorporating the provisions on notification in 
the WEA in 2007.  
The precondition for whistleblowing is that something censurable has occurred. This is commonly 
defined as acts or conditions that are illegitimate, immoral and/or illegal (cf. the definition given by 
Near & Miceli et al., 1985). The question remains, however, how the criteria of illegitimacy, 
immorality or illegality should be understood and interpreted. This might vary between countries, 
branches and workplaces. The preparatory works for the provisions on notification in the WEA 
states that censurable conditions include violations of relevant legislation or breaches of ethical 
codes of conduct. It is therefore specified that ‘by censurable conditions are meant not only criminal 
(i.e. punishable) acts, but also contraventions of other legally defined prescriptions or prohibitions’ 
(Ot. prp. nr. 84 (2005–2006): 37, Lewis & Trygstad, 2009). Breaches of ethical codes of conduct refer 
to codes that have been issued by the enterprise in questions or norms generally accepted in the 
society ((Ot. prp. nr. 84 (2005–2006): 17).   
According to the WEA, an employee has ‘a right to notify concerning censurable conditions at the 
undertaking’, which covers both internal and external whistleblowing.5 Norway has, together with 
Ireland, Sweden and the UK, what Vandekerckhove (2010) labels a three-tiered system of 
                                                 
5 It has been argued that whistleblowing as a concept should be limited to external whistleblowing (Haglunds, 2009), but as stated 
by Miceli et al. (2008), internal and external whistleblowing are rather to be seen as two sides of the same coin. Empirical findings 
show that employees report misconduct internally, most often to their immediate supervisor, before reporting the issue outside 
the organization (ibid., Trygstad et al., 2014). 
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whistleblowing legislation, which involves I) reporting inside the organization, II) reporting to 
supervisory authorities, and in some cases III) reporting to the public, e.g. media. Section 2 A-1 (2) 
of WEA provides that the employee must ‘follow an appropriate procedure when notifying’, but 
regardless of this, the worker will have a right to notify when there is a duty to notify, or in 
accordance with the routines for notification at the workplace. Further, reporting of wrongdoing 
tom for example, union representatives, health and safety inspectors or supervisory authorities such 
as the Norwegian Labour Inspectorate, is always regarded as appropriate.  In most cases, it will also 
be considered appropriate to report the wrongdoing to the immediate supervisor or a manager, and 
sometimes also externally to the media. This applies i) if the incident constitutes a danger to life or  
health, ii) if there is a danger of destruction of evidence, iii) if one fears sanctions by reporting the 
incident, or iv) if one has tried to report the incident internally without any success (ref). When 
reporting in a proper way, the whistleblowers are protected from retaliation and unfair treatment. 
Section 2 A–1(3) of WEA 2005 places the burden on the employer to prove that the notification was 
not in accordance with this section. Section 2 A-2 prohibits retaliation against whistleblowers. If 
there is reason to believe that retaliation has occurred, it is assumed to have taken place unless the 
employer ‘establishes otherwise’. Irrespective of the fault of the employer, compensation is 
available if the court considers it reasonable. In relation to facilitating notification, employers are 
obliged to develop routines for internal notification if there are five or more employed in the 
company (legislation changed in June 2017).   
After the legal changes in 2004 and 2007, it is possible to argue that Norwegian employees have a 
double protection. Freedom of expression gives them wide scope to express views outside the 
organization. In addition, the Working Environment Act is meant to protect them from sanctions 
when blowing the whistle on more serious matters (censurable conditions/wrongdoing) at the 
workplace.  In figure 1 we illustrate the double protection Norwegian employees have (Trygstad & 
Ødegård, 2014: 219).  
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3.2.3 CONTROVERSIAL CHANGES 
 
Fasterling (2014) points to the necessity of linking whistleblowing protection to other institutional 
features of a country, not only employees’ freedom of expression but also employment protection 
legislation and other relevant institutional arrangements. Norway stands out from liberalist 
countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, but also Denmark when it comes to a 
strong protection for the individual employee (Nesheim, 2017; OECD, 2010). Further, the Norwegian 
(as well as the Nordic) working life model is characterized by an inclusive employment regime with 
rather high and stable union density and wide coverage by collective agreements. Co-operation 
between employers and employees is a key element in the Norwegian model, at industry as well as 
at company level. Additionally, according to laws and agreements, Norwegian employees have 
different channels for voice (Hagen & Trygstad, 2009). The legislative changes in the Constitution 
and the WEA could therefore be seen as a further expansion of democracy at work. According to 
leading scholars of institutional theory, legal changes that strengthen pre- existing rules and 
practices are commonly seen as easier to accomplish (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Pierson, 2004; 
Scott, 1995). Surprisingly, this does not seem to be the story here. The changes, especially in the 
Working Environment Act were controversial. While important trade unions in the public sector 
strongly argued for the need for whistleblowing legislation, all the organizations on the employer 
side were against it (Trygstad, 2017). They saw no need to introduce a statutory right to disclose, 
and referred to the democratic tradition that characterizes Norwegian working life. 
This controversy and its consequences might be a question of power.  Seen from the employers’ 
organizations’ point of view, the changes were at odds with two key principles: the managerial 
prerogative and the duty of loyalty (Trygstad, 2017). In terms of the legal aspects, it was pointed out 
that whistleblowers were already protected through existing legislation. The employers’ 
organizations feared that a statutory right to disclose would act as ‘encouragement to persons who 
fail to act in accordance with the requirements for loyalty, but pursue their own objectives through 
such acts.’ (Trygstad, 2017:186). This standpoint was opposed by those who claimed that the 
proposed provisions on disclosure did not go far enough. These included the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman and professional associations, such as the Norwegian Nurses Organization and the 
Union of Education Norway. It seems that the legal changes disturbed ed the power balance 
between labour and capital (Trygstad, 2017).  
 
3.3 METHODOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS  
 
A number of large-scale studies on freedom of expression and whistleblowing have been conducted 
in Norway during the 2000s. In this chapter, we use data from five different whistleblowing surveys 
covering the entire Norwegian labour market (Bjørkelo, 2010; Fritt Ord Foundation, 2013; 
Matthiesen et al., 2008; Trygstad, 2010, Trygstad & Ødegård, 2016). In two of them, (Fritt Ord 
Foundation, 2013 and Trygstad & Ødegård, 2016) questions concerning freedom of expression are 
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included. The surveys were conducted after the 2004 legislative changes in the Constitution and the 
WEA in 2007. All surveys have data that illustrate the whistleblowing processes (see below).  
In addition, we use data from a survey among Norwegian trade union representatives during 
autumn 2014 (hereafter the TU survey). In the TU survey, trade union representatives were asked 
if they knew about the whistleblowing legislation and how they evaluated the effect of the new 
sections in WEA 2005. The same questions were asked in Skivenes & Trygstad (2010) and in Trygstad 
& Ødegård (2016). This makes it possible to compare data over time.  
In this chapter, we will mostly be referring to our latest study from 2016, which covers employees 
across sectors and industry. The response rate was 51 per cent, and the sample consisted of 3155 
people who answered the questions in a web-based survey during the spring of 2016. 29 percent 
was from the public sector, 68 percent from the private sector and 3 percent were students. The 
sample was representative regarding sector, gender, education and working hours. There is, 
however, an over-representation of employees in the age group 55-66 years, at the expense of 
younger people. In order to compensate for this bias, we have weighted our descriptive analyses 
but not our regression and, correlation analyses or when we test for significance.   
 
3.3.1 MEASURES IN USE 
 
To measure the employees experienced freedom of expression we use an index constructed out of 
six different variables. The Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.84. The variables have five values, where 1=totally 
disagree and 5=totally agree.  
1. My opportunities to publicly refer to seriously unfair workplace conditions are limited by my 
superior 
2. The top management does not appreciate that employees participate in public debates 
3. I do not feel free answer questions and requests from the press about working conditions 
4. My employment contract limits my opportunities to comment on my workplace 
5. At my workplace, employees are sanctioned by senior managers when they speak publicly 
6. Top management limits my opportunities to express my opinion publicly by referring to the 
enterprise’s reputation. 
We also ask if the employees have procedures s that regulate who can voice their opinion publicly 
and respond to requests from the media.  
When speaking about the whistleblowing process, we refer to whistleblowing activity, 
whistleblowing efficiency and whistleblowing sanctions. 
Whistleblowing activity refers to those who have observed serious wrongdoing at the workplace in 
the last 12 months and have reported the misconduct to someone with power to take action. 16 
per cent (442 employees) have witnessed, observed or uncovered incidents of wrongdoing during 
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the last 12 months that ought to be stopped. Those who had observed wrongdoing in the preceding 
12 months were asked whether they reported the wrongdoing to anyone inside or outside the 
organization. We used the most common definition of whistleblowing: «The disclosure by 
organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the 
control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action» (Near & 
Miceli 1985). Whistleblowing was coded as (0) if an employee experienced wrongdoing and did not 
report it, and it was coded as (1) if the employee reported it to anyone with power to effect action. 
Whistleblowing efficiency refers to whether or not it helps to blow the whistle, while whistleblowing 
sanctions refer to retaliation against whistleblowers. We asked the employees whether their report 
of wrongdoing had led to rectification of the wrongdoing.  The response alternatives were: (1) The 
situation was resolved, (2) A clear improvement occurred, (3) A certain improvement occurred, (4) 
No significant changes occurred, (5) A certain deterioration occurred, and (6) A clear deterioration 
occurred, (7) Too early to say. In regression analysis, the last group is excluded.  
Reaction: The respondents were asked if they had experienced some sort of reaction to their 
whistleblowing. The alternatives included (1) unambiguously positive feedback (2) no reactions, (3) 
mixed reactions that include both positive and negative feedback, and (4) unambiguously negative 
reactions. In the regression analysis, we have excluded those who reported (2), and merged joint 
together (3) and (4). In our logistic analysis, unambiguously positive feedback is coded (0), mixed 
and unambiguously negative feedback is coded (1).  
We also asked respondents whether the workplace has formal whistleblowing procedures. Those 
who had were coded (1) and those who had not were coded (2). In the surveys conducted in 2010, 
2013 and 2016 similar definitions are used when mapping the whistleblowing process. Research 
shows that the definitions used for wrongdoing (censurable conditions) and whistleblowing have a 
major impact on the findings (cf. Skivenes & Trygstad, 2012). 
 
3.4 FINDINGS 
 
In this section, we report findings related to employees’ perceived freedom of expression and their 
whistleblowing activity. In addition, we will present the trade union representatives’ views and 
experiences of the new provisions in the Working Environment Act introduced in 2007.  We start 
with our first research question: To what extent is it unproblematic for employees to raise opinions 
outside the workplace?  
 
3.4.1 FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
 
Making a public statement to journalists or in communications to editors is not a common 
occurrence for most employees, even if the parameters for employees’ freedom of expression are 
broad. Most workers are highly loyal to their company. When asking employees to assess their right 
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to voice concerns externally, we have emphasized that this does not include statements that violate 
the statutory duty of confidentiality. In figure 2, we see how Norwegian employees assess different 
aspects of freedom of expression. 
Almost six out of ten fully or partly agree that they do not feel free to answer questions from the 
press about issues related to their workplace, and almost four out of ten agree that senior 
management limits their opportunities to speak in public out of concern for the workplace 
reputation. Further, one third recall having signed an agreement with their employer which restrict 
their opportunity to mention the company in public.  Almost the same share (one in three) agrees 
that the management does not appreciate employees’ participation in public debates. Moreover, 
31 per cent of employees believe that their opportunity to publicly voice concerns about serious 
wrongdoing is restricted by superiors. There are however a smaller number (19 percent) that states 
that employees are sanctioned when they speak out in public. The same statements were assessed 
by employees in 2013. The overall conclusion is a rather stable picture. In 2016, as in 2013, we find 
a significant difference in how public and private employees assess the statements. Employees in 
the public sector assess the statements in figure 2 more negatively than those in the private sector. 
The same is true when we control for size of the enterprise, the respondents’ education and length 
of service.  Also other factors might make a difference, such as gender and educational level (table 
1).  
Table 1 Indicators that affect the employee’s assessment of their freedom of expression (externally). 
Indicators B T-value 
Constant 3,73  22,1***  
Women ,22  5,81***  
Higher education -,12  -5,52***  
Number of employees at the workplace ,05  4,85***  
Reorganisation process -,19  -4,9***  
Public sector ,1  2,5**  
N=2403, Adjusted R2=. 1 
 
**sign.p<.05; ***sign.p<.01 
The model has limited explanatory power. Gender, education and reorganization affect the 
assessment of the external climate for using voice. Women assess the external climate less 
favourably than men. An explanation may be related to how women's expressions in public are 
received. Research has pointed out that while men receive comments on their opinions, women 
often receive negative feedback related to gender and how they look (Hagen, 2015). This may affect 
female assessment. The fact that highly educated people consider their freedom of expression as 
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being better than those with low education, can be related to the professions' position and that the 
highly educated are more centrally placed in the work organization. Consequently, they also have 
more power than those with low education. In addition, our analysis indicates that those who have 
been through reorganization over the last two years consider their opportunities to voice their 
opinion to the public to be worse than the rest. In previous surveys we have similar findings 
(Trygstad et al, 2006). It seems like the management’s tolerance for criticism is weakened when the 
business has been through reorganization. We don’t know if this is a transient or more lasting 
phenomenon. But the fact that critical voices are weakened during change processes can also cause 
workers to fail to speak out about decisions, processes and effects that should have been changed. 
 
3.4.2 PROCEDURES THAT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION? 
 
We also asked if the employees work in enterprises with procedures that regulate freedom of 
expression.  48 percent of the respondents work in enterprises with such routines, and 56 percent 
have routines that regulate who can talk to journalists. There are no differences between public and 
private sector employees. We do, however, find an interesting correlation between those who have 
routines and the assessment of their freedom of expression (see figure 3). We use an index 
constructed out of six different variables (see section 3.3) as a measure of employee’s assessment 
of their external freedom of expression. A low score indicates good opportunities for voice and vice 
versa.   
The analyses indicate that the respondents who have procedures which regulate expression assess 
their external opportunities for expression significantly worse than those without. One obvious 
explanation may be that the routines are formulated in a way that restricts instead of opening up 
the employees’ freedom of expression at company level.  It is worth mentioning that the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman on several occasions during the last few years has affirmed that public-
sector enterprises, including municipal ones, have imposed restrictions that violate Section 100 of 
the Constitution with regard to the employees’ freedom of expression. Many of these restrictions 
are found in different forms such as those mentioned above.  
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Figure 2. Norwegian employees’ assessment of their right to speak publicly. Those who fully or partly agree. N=2885. 
 
Figure 3. Freedom of expression and the presence of procedures. Differences in means. One-way Anova. N=3087 
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3.4.3 THE WHISTLEBLOWING PROCESS 
 
In this section, we focus on our second research question: have the changes in WEA made it easier 
and safer to blow the whistle for Norwegian employees? Altogether 16 per cent of those who 
responded to our latest study (2016) had witnessed or experienced wrongdoing/censurable 
conditions at the workplace during the preceding year. 53 per cent reported it. This proportion of 
whistle blowing activity is in line with results from other studies (see table 2). Whistleblowing 
efficiency refers to whether the whistleblowing partly or completely solved the problem. In this last 
survey from 2016, 36 per cent of the respondents believe that whistleblowing has an effect. This is 
a lower proportion than we have previously found. Further, in 2016 one in four is met with reprisals. 
We have never before measured such a high proportion in the Norwegian labour market.  
Table 2 summarizes the main points in the surveys that have encompassed the entire labour market, 
across sectors and industries concerning the whistleblowing process. All these have included 
mapping and analyses of self-reported whistleblowing and the consequences of this activity. Thus, 
the basis of the analysis is the reporting by employees of their experience of censurable conditions 
in the workplace.  
 
Table 2. Findings from studies in the Norwegian labour market  
 Matthiesen et 
al. 2008 
N=1604 
Trygstad 2010 
N=6000 
Bjørkelo et al. 
2010 
N=2539 
Freedom of 
expression 
2013 
N=1169 
Trygstad & 
Ødegård 2016 
N=3160 
Whistleblowing activity 55% 53% 12% 64% 53% 
Whistleblowing effectiveness  51% 50% 59% 52% 36% 
Proportion  of whistleblowers 
exposed to reprisals 
18% 13% 7% 15% 25% 
Proportion that would blow the 
whistle again 
81% 82%    - 84% 71% 
Proportion of those who have 
whistleblowing procedures at work 
19 % 42 %  55 % 51 % 
Note: Whistleblowing activity: The proportion of employees that have witnessed censurable conditions 
(wrongdoing) during the last 12 months and then ‘blew the whistle’. Whistleblowing effectiveness: Refers to 
the question did it help to blow the whistle? Was the wrongdoing terminated or reduced? 
Table 2 shows some variations in whistleblowing activity (those who have observed serious 
wrongdoing in the last 12 months and have reported the misconduct to someone with power to 
take action) but also a relatively high degree of stability around such factors as the effectiveness of 
disclosure and the use of sanctions.  
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In the surveys conducted by Matthiesen et al in 2008, Trygstad in 2010 and Trygstad & Ødegård in 
2016, the level of whistleblowing activity is nearly identical. This stability indicates that there has 
been no major increase in whistleblowing activity over this time span. The most prevalent 
reprehensible issues in 2016 include ‘destructive leadership that is detrimental to the working 
environment’, ‘violations of ethical guidelines’ and ‘conditions that may pose a risk to life and 
health’. It is, however, a rather high proportion that do not blow the whistle. When asked why, the 
most common reason is fear for reprisals (Trygstad & Ødegård, 2016). 
As regards whistleblowing efficiency (whether it helps to blow the whistle), the results are relatively 
similar over a period of a little more than five years. We, however, see a severe decline from 2013 
to 2016 when 36 per cent of respondents believe that whistleblowing is effective. In the report 
‘Status for freedom of expression in Norway’ (2014), a total of 54 per cent of the respondents stated 
that whistleblowing has an effect. In other words, when it comes to efficiency, we see a rather 
significant reduction from 2013 to 2016.  
In terms of the proportion of employees who have faced retaliation after their disclosures, the share 
varies from 7 percent (the lowest) to 25 percent (the highest). There is a significant increase from 
2013 to 2016 in the proportion of employees who respond that they faced reprisals (sanctions) as a 
consequence of having blown the whistle on censurable conditions. What is meant by retaliation 
and sanctions may be unclear, since there are numerous virtually invisible ways to strike back at the 
whistleblower, such as deferred promotion and giving him/her fewer/other job tasks. In this study, 
the most common negative reaction included rebukes and reprimands from a superior.   
It is also a significantly reduced proportion who report their willingness to blow the whistle again if 
they should find themselves in a similar position.  Previous studies have shown that witnessing 
reprehensible conditions is a strain on those involved, and it also has a demoralizing and de-
motivating effect (Miceli et al, 2012). On the other hand, the same studies show that if wrongdoing 
if rectified, the negative consequences are minimized.  In our latest study, four out of ten believe 
that their whistleblowing had no effect. In addition to the consequences described above, it is 
reasonable to assume that this may have a chilling effect on the willingness to blow the whistle.  
Finally, table 2 indicates that there has been an increase in employees who have whistleblowing 
procedures in their workplace during the period. In 2013 and 2016 around half of them reported 
that they have such routines.  
The findings from 2016 underscore the reasons for concern over developments in Norwegian 
working life when it comes to whistleblowing. Furthermore, this study (2016) shows that 43 per cent 
of those who are the main recipients of whistleblowing reports, i.e. managers, safety delegates and 
trade union officials, failed to investigate whether the employee who submitted the report to them 
was exposed to reprisals either during or after the whistleblowing process.   
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3.4.4 WHAT MATTERS? 
 
In several international studies the effect of demographic variables such as gender, length of service, 
education, etc. on the whistleblowing process have been tested. The results indicate that they do 
not have a great impact either on who blows the whistle or the outcome (Miceli et al., 2008; 
Skivenes & Trygstad 2010, 2015). Skivenes and Trygstad (2015) find that institutional arrangements 
at the workplace make a difference. The presence of trade union representatives at the company 
level and whistleblowing procedures increase the probability of success when reporting wrongdoing 
(Trygstad, 2017:188). The explanation given is that while trade union representatives can function 
as a safety net, whistleblowing procedures seem to contribute to predictability in whistleblowing 
processes (Skivenes & Trygstad, 2015). However, even in enterprises where these institutional 
arrangements are present, whistleblowing can be risky. Whistleblowers can harm powerful people, 
challenge the power structures and provide the public with information that may be regarded as 
damaging for the organization.  In the 2016 survey these variables seem to contribute positively to 
whistleblowing efficiency and heighten the risk of retaliation.6  
 
Table 3. What may influence efficiency and increase the risk of retaliation? Regression analyses. 
 Efficiency Sanction 
If one has been through  a 
reorganization process 
*** ** 
The position of the responsible 
person 
 
*** 
 
*** 
Presence of WB procedures   
*** 
 
*** 
**sign.p<.05; ***sign.p<.01 
 
We find that gender, education, time in office, size of the company or sector have no significant 
impact in the analyses. The analysis does, however, give us three rather clear findings. Firstly, there 
seems to be a better environment for whistleblowing for employees who work in firms that haven’t 
been subject to reorganization processes in the last two years. Those who have been through such 
process, report lower efficiency and a higher risk of retaliation when they blow the whistle. One 
explanation may be that the tolerance for critique and reports of misconduct is easily interpreted 
as noise that hinders the process of change.  
                                                 
6 See http://www.fafo.no/images/pub/2016/20595_Vedlegg2.pdf for the analysis. 
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Secondly, the analyses confirm previous findings (see Skivenes & Trygstad, 2010, 2015). If the person 
responsible for the misconduct is a manager, whistleblowing-efficiency is lower and the risk for 
retaliation is higher.  In other words, it is less ‘risky’ to blow the whistle when the person responsible 
for the wrongdoing is a colleague and not å superior and the chances of succeeding seem to 
increase. 
Thirdly, it is interesting to note that while procedures for information and media contact seems to 
reduce the employees’ assessment of their right to speak in public, whistleblowing procedures have 
a more positive impact, at least on the internal process. The analyses in table 3 confirms previous 
findings (Trygstad, 2015), that whistleblowing procedures have a positive impact upon the 
whistleblowing process. One obvious reason, as pointed out by Lewis and Vandekerckhove (2011) 
and Olsen (2014), is that it makes the whistleblowing process less arbitrary.  In 2017 it became 
mandatory for enterprises with five or more employees to establish such routines in the enterprise.  
So far, our findings do not indicate that the whistleblowing process has become easier or safer after 
the changes in the WEA. We turn now to a group given an important role in the whistleblowing 
legislation: employees representatives.  
 
3.4 5 THE ROLES AND VIEWS OF TRADE UNION-REPRESENTATIVES AND SAFETY DELEGATES 
 
Trade union representatives and safety delegates at the workplace are given a central place in the 
whistleblowing legislation and can play different roles in the whistleblowing process. In general, 
they are normally advocates of an open culture in order to safeguard co-decision and a healthy 
working environment. When something is wrong, they might firstly act as a whistleblower 
themselves, and secondly, they might be recipients of reports from whistleblowers at the 
workplace. Remember that to notify to a trade union representative or a safety delegate is always 
permissible under the Working Environment Act. Thirdly, trade union representatives or a safety 
delegate can play an important role when it comes to protecting whistleblowers from retaliation. 
As mentioned earlier, many of the national trade unions in Norway advocated the new legislation 
on freedom of expression and protection of whistleblowers.  This position, together with their 
different roles, makes it interesting to see how the trade union-representatives together with safety 
delegates at the workplaces consider the effect of the new legislation in the Working Environment 
Act. In 2010, 2014 and 2016 we asked if they believe the whistleblowing legislation has made it safer 
and easier to blow the whistle. In figure 3, we have listed the proportion that answered ‘Totally 
agree’ and ‘Partly agree’.   
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Figure 3: The impact of the changes in the Working Environment Act seen from the trade union-
representatives’ point of view.  
 
(Percent, N=1062/990/270) (Source: Trygstad, 2010; TU survey, 2014). 
 
The proportions of trade union representatives and safety delegates that agree or partly agree with 
the statements ‘The WB legislation has made it safer to notify’ and ‘The WB-legislation has made it 
easier to notify’ are almost identical; 44 percent both in 2010 and 2014.  However, we do see signs 
of a slight decrease in 2016. This development leads us to the conclusion that the new provisions 
have had a moderate effect, seen from a whistleblowing recipient’s point of view. It is fair to relate 
these findings to the fact that the ‘black box’ still has to be opened. The law cannot make up for a 
culture hostile to critique and the reporting of wrongdoing. It is, however, important to note that 
we do not know how the situation would have been without this legislation.  
 
3.5 DISCUSSION 
 
During the 2000s important changes were made in the regulatory framework related to Norwegian 
employees’ opportunity to use voice at work. Comparatively speaking, after the amendments, 
Norway has one of the strongest protections for freedom of expression in Europe. In this section we 
discuss what kind of effects the amendments in the Constitution (2004) and in the Working 
Environment Act (2007) may have had when it comes to the perceived opportunities to voice 
criticism in public and to blow the whistle at the workplace. Our findings underscore the reasons for 
concerns over the development.   
Openness and transparency are preconditions for detecting and dealing with gross errors, 
wastefulness and abuse. For employers, it is also crucial that employees participate in professionally 
related discussions of priorities and issues related to health, safety and the environment. For 
employees, it is important to enjoy co-determination in the workplace. However, the employer’s 
ability to handle criticism and unpleasant information is a precondition for this to happen.  
The legislator’s intention by changing the Constitution and the WEA was to strengthen employee’s 
freedom of expression and to promote a democratic working life even further (Egge, 2008; Elvander 
2011). As pointed out previously, the changes did not represent something entirely new, but 
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followed the path of workplace democracy. One could therefore assume that the changes would 
lead to a process towards layering. Layering describes a process of sedimentation that takes place 
when new elements are added to old ones (Mahoney & Thelen, 2009; Streeck & Thelen, 2005; 
Thelen, 2004). As part of a layering process, one could expect that the legislative changes, in 
combination with massive public attention to freedom of expression in general and whistleblowing 
in particular, would make it easier and safer to participate in the public debate and if necessary to 
voice criticism and blow the whistle about illegal and unethical actions and incidents at the 
workplace. But, as shown, the results from different surveys after 2007 do not support such a 
hypothesis, and it is surprising that a legal framework that promotes reporting of concerns about 
corruption, waste, theft and harassment was and still is so controversial among the employers.  
 
3.5.1 DISTURBING FINDINGS 
 
The majority of the observed wrongdoing cases are related to the working environment in general 
and management in particular. In conjunction with trade union representatives and safety 
delegates, management has a particular responsibility for ensuring a fully acceptable working 
environment, pursuant to the Norwegian Working Environment Act. We have also seen that fear of 
reprisals is a key reason for failing to blow the whistle. Overall, this indicates that a significant 
proportion of employees find it difficult to voice criticism and report wrongdoing. Further, in the 
2016-survey we found that the whistleblowing effectiveness was lower, the share of whistleblowers 
exposed to sanctions higher and the proportion that would blow the whistle again lower than in the 
studies from 2008 to 2013. We have also seen that employees who have been through 
organizational changes assess their opportunity to express themselves in public less favourably than 
others, they succeed less and experience a higher risk of retaliation if they blow the whistle. The 
same goes for those who report incidents for which a superior is responsible. How can we explain 
these negative findings from 2016?  
As previously observed, when new elements supplement old ones, a possible outcome is a 
reinforcement of the original purpose. One can, however, end up in a situation of tension inside 
already established institutions, such as the existing framework of workplace democracy (Engelstad, 
2015; Trygstad, 2017). Actors with power can use different strategies to hinder a layering process, 
in our case widening the scope of workplace democracy. As mentioned in section 2, employees’ 
participation and influence are not the only elements embedded in the Norwegian model of labour 
relations. Managerial prerogative and the duty of loyalty are just as important. The resistance that 
the legal changes seem to have provoked   may be considered as a response to what the employers 
and their organizations saw as challenges to the power balance. As stated earlier, the employers’ 
organizations were not in favour of a statutory right for whistleblowers in the first place. It was 
argued that whistleblowers already enjoyed a legal protection through the Working Environment 
Act. In addition, they feared that these provisions could be misused.   
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We will, however, argue that the employers’ reactions might have been influenced by leading 
concepts of management. One question is whether models and principles that emphasize the 
managerial prerogative have increased demands for loyalty and made it particularly difficult to 
develop a climate for free speech, critical voices and whistleblowing. Managerial prerogative and 
loyalty, together with committed employees, have for decades been seen as central concepts of 
management. Although different, these concepts (e.g. TQM, HRM, NPM, Lean) have some common 
features. They are all developed in labour market models quite different from the so-called Nordic 
model. Researchers have argued that these concepts challenge the cooperative relationship and the 
ideas of workplace democracy, characterized by extensive participation and co-determination, as 
we know them in Nordic countries (Busck et al, 2010; Finnestrand, 2015; Hagen & Trygstad, 2009; 
Tønnesen 2007). Individual participation is emphasized and justified on the grounds of efficiency. In 
such a context, voice and criticism may be interpreted as noise and as damaging to a streamlined 
production. Implementation of procedures that regulate employees’ contact with journalists and 
what they can say in public illustrate such a development. Our studies show that those who have 
such procedures at the workplace assess their opportunities to express themselves publicly as less 
than those without. In the sector, the Government Ombudsman has several times pointed to the 
fact that public sector employees’ possibility for using voice is illegally restricted and that public 
sector employers therefore violate the Constitution.  
At the workplace, it will be essential to discuss measures that can promote a culture in which 
criticism and whistleblowing is handled constructively and with tolerance of critical viewpoints. This 
makes demands not only of the recipients of criticism and whistleblowing, but also of the 
messengers. It is conditioned by provision of information and a willingness to discuss difficult cases. 
 
3.5.2 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
As previously noted, freedom of expression is a key element in a democratic working life. The 
purpose of the Working Environment Act is to secure a meaningful, healthy working environment 
free from harmful physical and mental influences. A healthy working environment also entails that 
employees have the opportunity to express themselves in a critical way about conditions in the 
workplace. The freedom of expression and the WEA provisions intended to protect whistleblowers 
provide a legal framework for encouraging workers come forward with their views. However, in 
order to foster critical viewpoints from employees, the working environment and organizational 
climate are also important aspects. In the preparatory papers for the WEA it is stated that a climate 
where the employees have real opportunities to speak out about wrongdoing is an essential feature 
of a good working environment and a healthy business culture (Ot.prp. nr. 84. 2005-2006). The 
changes made to the WEA in 2007 were based on the recognition that challenging people in power 
within an organization involves the risk of retaliation (Bakken & Dalby, 2007; Bjørkelo, 2010; Brown 
et al, 2008; Skivenes & Trygstad, 2010). An essential feature of a healthy working environment is 
that employees are not afraid to be subjected to reprisals from employers or from other colleagues. 
Our findings do not indicate that the whistleblowing process has become easier or safer after the 
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changes in the WEA. We find that fear of reprisals is a key reason for failing to blow the whistle. 
Further, our results show that one in four employees encounters management displeasure when 
voicing critical views of workplace issues. It seems that the organizational climate and the business 
culture are important features to why this is the case. As previously pointed out, the management 
has a particular responsibility to ensure a fully acceptable working environment. It goes without 
saying that how management handles these issues is a crucial part of a healthy work environment. 
To succeed, it is important to create a culture where participating in discourse is considered 
valuable. Achieving this requires information and communication, as well as training and a lot of 
targeted effort.   
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4. The UN whistleblowing protection gap: implications for 
governance, human rights and risk management 
 
Caroline Hunt-Matthes and Peter Anthony Gallo 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
UN staff members are duty bound to report misconduct in accordance with the rules drawn from 
the 1946 Charter of the United Nations.  Since the UN Ethics Office was established under the 
‘whistleblower protection’ policy (ST/SGB/2005/21), it has summarily rejected an extraordinary 
96 per cent of protection applications in its decade of operation from 2006 - 2016. 
Transparency is a prerequisite for accountability.  The reality of UN whistleblower protection failure 
became clear when a United Nations legal precedent in 2011 (Hunt-Matthes 2011/UNDT/063) 
opened UN Ethics Office decisions to independent legal scrutiny which revealed grave errors by the 
UN Ethics Office in the implementation of that policy. 
The 2011 case [precedent] encouraged more UN staff to come forward to request judicial review of 
the UN Ethics Office decisions.  Every case between 2011-2014 reviewed by the UN Tribunal 
determined that the Ethics Office had exercised their discretion in error and failed to protect 
whistleblowers, or were proactive in shooting the messenger for doing his/her job.  In 2014, 
however, a controversial UN Appeals Tribunal (UNAT) judgement determined that the UN Ethics 
Office decisions could no longer be challenged.  This judgement (Wasserstrom 2014/UNAT/457) 
bears the hallmark of what Montesquieu referred to as ‘tyranny perpetuated under the shield of 
law and in the name of justice’ (de Montesquieu, 1748). This decision has arguably fostered, and 
not deterred, a retaliation culture.  Moreover, it inhibits organizational learning and transparency, 
and it discourages staff from reporting wrongdoing. 
The new whistleblower policy introduced in January 2017 (ST/SGB/2017/2) by the 9th UN Secretary 
General does little towards acknowledging the shortcomings of the preceding policy and will be 
implemented using the same mechanisms that have failed UN staff over the past decade. 
This chapter profiles the challenges confronting UN Ethics mechanisms charged with whistleblower 
protection in, the last decade (2006-2016) and considers the evidence for its tainted independence 
which have resulted in declining numbers of UN staff claiming protection under the policy. This has, 
in turn, created unnecessary risk for the organisation.7  
                                                 
7  The mandate of the UN Ethics Office also includes dispensing confidential ethics advice; ethics awareness and education, 
managing a financial disclosure programme and  promotion of coherence and common ethics standards across the UN family. This 
paper does not address these aspects of the mandate.  
   39 
 
Figure 1. UN ETHICS OFFICE  Protection against retaliation statistics 2006-2016  
 
 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013 2013-2014 2014-2015 2015-2016  
Completed preliminary review 12 16 22 14 13 14 15 16 14 17 
Prima facie determination 
resulting in referral for 
investigation 2 1 1 2 1 2 3 3 0 6 
Determination of retaliation after 
investigation 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 1 0 
Pen
d-
ing 
 Source UN Ethics Office Report to General Assembly 2016 
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4.1 UN IMPLEMENTATION OF WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION:  A DECADE OF FAILURE (2006-
2016) 
 
The UN staff regulations and rules create a mandatory reporting obligation, and also prohibit 
retaliation against staff who comply with that obligation.  
Rule 1.2(c) of the UN Staff Rules is unequivocal in stating: 
Staff members have the duty to report any breach of the Organization’s regulations and rules 
to the officials whose responsibility it is to take appropriate action and to cooperate with duly 
authorized audits and investigations.  Staff members shall not be retaliated against for 
complying with these duties. 
 
UN staff are required to meet the highest standards of ‘efficiency, competence, and integrity,’ 
(Article 101(3) Charter of the United Nations) where the concept of integrity includes, but is not 
limited to, probity, impartiality, fairness, honesty and truthfulness in all matters affecting their work 
and status. (UN Staff Rules 1.2) 
The European Union’s first ever Anti-Corruption Report (2014) noted that  
[...] whistleblowing faces difficulties given the general reluctance to report such acts within 
one’s own organisation, and fear of retaliation. To remedy this, effective protection 
mechanisms must give confidence to potential whistleblowers.   
 
A growing evidence base, however, indicates that potential UN whistleblowers do not trust the 
protection mechanisms, despite it being incumbent upon them to report wrongdoing. (Internal UN 
staff surveys between 2012 and 2017 and the UN Joint Inspection Unit 2011) 
This chapter will confine its analysis to the evidence of the effectiveness of the implementation of 
the UN ‘whistleblower protection’ policy (ST/SGB/2005/21) solely in relation to the function of 
protection against retaliation which has a direct bearing on the detection of corruption in the United 
Nations.  
The UN Ethics Office maintains that 96 per cent of those requesting protection did not meet the 
criteria of the policy.  However, in 100 per cent of cases where the UNDT subsequently 
independently reviewed the Ethics Office’s rationale for refusal to protect those applicants, the 
judges found the UN Ethics Office determination was flawed. To date the UN Ethics office has 
remained silent on the issue of its responsibility for those errors. 
The mistreatment of whistleblowers who fulfilled their duty to report misconduct is a grim chapter 
in the arbitrary use of power in the United Nations. 
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4.1.1 A CENTRAL TENET OF GOOD GOVERNANCE - A SAFE ENVIRONMENT TO REPORT 
WRONGDOING 
 
An important UN internal study entitled ‘Ethics in the United Nations System’8 by the UN Joint 
Inspection Unit9 found that the Ethics Office was perceived to lack independence and was therefore 
not a safe mechanism for the proper protection of staff who report misconduct (Wynes & Zahran, 
2010). 
In this report the UN Joint Inspection Unit found in their system-wide assessment of the ethics 
function that:  
[…] there was a strongly held perception throughout the United Nations System of a pervasive 
culture of secrecy in the decision-making processes of the organizations and little, or no 
accountability. Against this background, there was little staff buy-in to the ethics function, 
which was viewed merely as a management device that did nothing to address the underlying 
problems.  […]  Without staff confidence and staff involvement, however, the ethics function 
will struggle to make an impact. It is of paramount importance, therefore, that the ethics 
function operates independently of management. 
These structural issues are further exacerbated by lack of redress available to UN staff through the 
internal justice system.  Statistics on UNAT judgements indicate a growing perception of an inherent 
bias in the UN Appeals Tribunal against the staff member returning judgements in favour of the staff 
in 12 per cent of cases (Gallo, 2017). 
 
4.1.2 THE CRUX OF THE ISSUE IS UN GOVERNANCE 
 
The reluctance by UN management to sanction wrongdoers at the senior level is the crux of the 
issue.  Research indicates that shortcomings in accountability will inevitably taint the reputation of 
a whole organization, even when the majority of staff members are hardworking, law-abiding and 
dedicated (Felps et al, 2006).  The ramifications of reputational damage are most serious for the 
world body. 
The UN’s unique legal status means in practice that UN staff, in the conduct of their official duties, 
are subject to no national laws, only the internal system at the UN itself (Ahluwalia, 1964; Bekker, 
1994). Functional immunity was envisaged to enable the performance of the UN mandate and to 
prevent political prosecutions not as a shield against accountability. Yet within that system, in too 
many cases, no action is taken to hold any senior official accountable for wrongdoing.  This contempt 
for its own law sends a message that accountability does not apply to senior UN officials.  
According to the Government Accountability Project (GAP) in Washington DC 2016:   
                                                 
8 Ethics in the UN system- Report of the Joint Inspection Unit JIU/REP/2010/3 para 44. 
9 The Joint Inspection Unit  is an independent oversight body of the United Nations System 
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The principle flaw in this arrangement is readily apparent: if senior managers are subject only 
to an internal system of justice, their authority may allow them to manipulate that system.  In 
such cases, they can engage in corruption, or ignore it when they see it, without incurring the 
consequences typically resulting from illegality (Edwards, 2016) 
 
4.1.3 THE UN: GUARDIAN OF UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
The dissonance between representing that whistleblowers are protected, and the reality that they 
are not, challenges the moral authority and credibility of the United Nations.  As the de facto 
guardian of universal human rights, this situation undermines the rights of its own staff members.  
In 2015, then Deputy Secretary-General, Jan Eliasson, confirmed in writing that  
freedom of opinion, as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is subject to 
reasonable restrictions, including the requirement to act in accordance with the United Nations 
Staff Regulations and Staff Rules (Eliasson, 2015). 
This position is not consistent with Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights or the position of its own UN special rapporteurs. Alfred de Zayas, UN Independent expert on 
the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order 2017 has called for: 
Governments worldwide to put an end to multiple campaigns of defamation, mobbing and 
even prosecution of whistleblowers like Julian Assange, Edward Snowden, the Luxleakers […] 
To hold United Nations staff members to a different human rights standard arguably erodes the 
moral authority of the organization. 
 
4.2 FACTORS TAINTING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE UN ETHICS OFFICE 
 
Several factors have influenced staff perceptions of the independence of the Ethics Office.  
According to The Government Accountability Project (GAP), requests for protection had dwindled 
across the secretariat world wide by 2016, a plausible indication of the lack of confidence (Edwards, 
2016). 
 
4.2.1 THE UN ETHICS OFFICE BEGAN ITS OPERATIONS WITHOUT PROPER RESOURCES IN 
JANUARY 2006 
 
Retaliation in the UN usually meets the statutory definitions of ‘harassment’ and ‘abuse of 
authority’, both of which constitute misconduct in their own right under ST/SGB/2008/5.10 The 
                                                 
10 Under that Bulletin however, these complaints are not investigated under normative OIOS procedures but by an ad hoc ‘fact 
finding panel’ comprising at least two individuals from the same department, office, or mission as the complainant, and who have 
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investigation of misconduct is the responsibility the Investigations Division of the UN Office of 
Internal Oversight Services (OIOS/ID) created in 1994. 
The UN Ethics Office was created by pressure from the General Assembly, led by United States, as 
part of the larger UN reform agenda to strengthen whistleblower protection. The whistleblower 
protection policy (ST/SGB/2005/21) was introduced and the UN Ethics Office established in January 
2006, but this was done in haste without a proper budget allocation.  Thus handicapped in its 
operations from the outset, the office was not fully staffed for almost 18 months. This arguably 
contributed to poor decision-making. 
 
4.2.2 DELEGATION OF THE CENTRALISED FUNCTION OF THE UN ETHICS OFFICE   
 
In 2007, the 8th United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki Moon, diluted coherence, independence 
and impartiality of the ethics function by authorizing the UN Funds and Programs to set up their 
own Ethics Offices. 
Factors such as the appointment of an independent Ethics Office Chief of sufficient integrity with 
proper terms of reference, as well as independent reporting lines to the legislative body of each 
organization, would be key indicators of independence.  Yet, the 2007 delegation of the Ethics 
function, moved from system in which one umbrella UN Ethics Office oversaw reports of retaliation 
to one that allowed each fund and program of the UN to have its own Ethics Office, thereby putting 
the day-to-day management of the whistleblower protection into the very hands of the 
management of those bodies (See Appendix). 
The Chart in the Appendix illustrates the characteristics of the new Ethics Offices using criteria 
developed by the UN Joint Inspection Unit in 2010.  According to GAP, many of these policies were 
found to be inconsistent, flawed by arbitrary loopholes and, on the whole, less comprehensive than 
the original UN policy established in 2005 (GAP, 2016).  Moreover, the Head of the UN Ethics Office, 
originally an Under-Secretary-General’s post, was subsequently downgraded to a Director post, 
diminishing its authority within the UN hierarchy. 
 
4.2.3 EVIDENCE OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE TAINTING THE ETHICS AND INVESTIGATION FUNCTION  
 
The General Assembly created an independent Office for Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) in 1994 
and the evidence of its initial success under the leadership of USG Karl Theodor Pashke is 
documented in OIOS reports to the General Assembly. 
                                                 
attended a short training course.  The independence of that process is questionable. Programme Managers may have a vested 
interest in ensuring that complaints against their managers are not upheld. This inherent conflict of interest could paradoxically 
contribute to retaliation being carried out within the parameters of the UN Staff Regulations and Rules. 
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OIOS has, however, more recently been subject to political interference during the evolution of its 
operations when the interests of the powerful were threatened.  In 2010, the outgoing USG/OIOS 
was heavily critical of interference from Secretary-General in her 2010 end of assignment report: 
I would like to ensure that my successor, the incoming USG/OIOS, will not have to spend three 
years defending the OIOS mandate and the operational independence of the Office against the 
Secretary-General himself; be it investigations or any of the other disciplines of the Office, audit 
or evaluations […] There is no transparency, there is lack of accountability. Rather than 
supporting the internal oversight which is the sign of strong leadership and good governance, 
you have strived to undermine its position and to control it. I do not see any signs of reform in 
the Organization […] Management at that [U.N.] Secretariat has never protected OIOS and ID 
[the Investigations Division] in particular from the political pressures exerted by member states 
when their interests are threatened (Alhenius, 2010). 
One example referred to by the USG Alhenius was the motive by the organisation for keeping the 
key post of UN Investigations Director vacant for two and a half years. As the UN Joint Inspection 
Unit pointed out in its report on the Investigation Function in the United Nations System: 
[…] investigators may be negatively influenced or even manipulated in performing their duties 
by individuals who may become their direct supervisors or play a role in their career 
advancement in the future (JIU, 2011). 
 
4.2.4 JUDICIAL REVIEW OF UN ETHICS OFFICE DECISIONS REVEALS ERRORS IN 100% OF CASES  
 
The gravity of the failure in implementation of UN accountability at the level of its Ethics Office are 
well documented in a number of UN judgments between 2011 and 2014. 
The UN Dispute Tribunal (UNDT) took jurisdiction to review Ethics Office decisions for the first time 
in 2011 (Hunt-Matthes UNDT/2011/063).  Central to Judge Boolel’s rational for his decision was that 
the Ethics Office decisions affect employment rights: 
[…] the Ethics Office, unlike the Office of the Ombudsman, has the requisite authority to make 
binding determinations affecting the rights of a party and should therefore not be allowed to 
operate in a legal vacuum […] 
 
This legal precedent allowed other UN staff to request judicial review of UN Ethics Office decisions.  
Remarkably, in every case reviewed by the UNDT between 2011 and 2014, the Tribunal found the 
Ethics Office had failed to protect UN staffers.  Moreover, case reports, discussed below record how 
the Ethics Director has simply ignored an Order from the Tribunal to protect a whistleblower from 
retaliation. 
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Hunt-Matthes (2004-Present):  Longest retaliation case in UN history on unilateral failure of internal 
whistleblower channels  
In January 2006, after reporting several ‘protected activities’, Ms. Hunt-Matthes, a Senior 
Investigation Officer, became the first UN staff member to apply to the UN Ethics Office for 
protection against retaliation, providing evidence of obstruction and overt interference from senior 
officials in the conduct and outcome of investigations at the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) Inspector Generals Office (IGO). Her disclosures included: 
October 2003: obstruction to her rape investigation by a UNHCR Country Representative committed 
by another UNHCR staff member;  
December 2003: the decision of the IGO to hire a staff member who was himself subject to an IGO 
investigation, and the failure of her supervisors to take corrective action against a wrongly fired staff 
member as a result of an erroneous investigation by her supervisor; 
January 2004, the refusal by her supervisors to follow registration procedures in the subsequently 
founded case of the sexual harassment by the UNHCR High Commissioner- (the supervisor of the 
Inspector General); 
July 2004: irregularities at the UNHCR Indonesia Office including the unlawful detention of refugees 
by senior UNHCR staff, leading to the death of a refugee while in detention, and a report of sexual 
exploitation of a refugee by a UNHCR staff member.  
The hallmark of this case is that investigations at each stage of due process for a whistleblower using 
internal channels were suppressed. This is a proactive strategy on the part of some employers 
(Martin, 1996). Witness testimony in the case highlighted political interference of the UNHCR 
investigation function to manipulate the process to get particular outcomes.  
As a result, she was separated from service on 27 August 2004 based on a flawed negative 
performance appraisal created by her supervisors post hoc. Her request for protection was denied 
by the UN Ethics Office, who used the impugned performance evaluation to justify its refusal to 
protect. The UNDT found the performance appraisal, constituted one of the ‘acts of retaliation 
against her’ for being a whistleblower. Her UNHCR supervisors and the legal department were 
referred to the Secretary General for accountability. No action was taken. The UNDT judge in 2013 
noted: 
There can be no doubt that [Hunt-Matthes’] uncompromising stance on the application of 
ethical and procedural standards to investigations caused discomfort at the highest levels. 
 
The UN appealed both UNDT judgements i.e. the substantive retaliation case (Hunt-Matthes 
2013/UNDT/085) and the UN Ethics Office failure to protect case (Hunt-Matthes 2013/UNDT/084) 
to the United Nations Appeal Tribunal (UNAT) which subsequently vacated both the UNDT 
judgments, after denying the request for an oral hearing.   
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In Hunt-Matthes UNAT 444/2014, the judges argued that the retaliation occurred before the UN 
Ethics Office was created in January 2006 and was therefore not receivable, in effect erasing UN 
Ethics Office negligence from the record. The UNAT ignored the fact that the original report was 
filed with OIOS, the responsible office for retaliation complaints in 2005 and that OIOS 
recommended the transfer of the request to the UN Ethics Office in April 2006.  These errors on the 
face of the record can be in part attributed to the refusal by UNAT of the request for an oral hearing 
in a complex case, against which there is no right of appeal.  The substantive retaliation case 
UNAT 443/2014 was referred back to the UNDT for a retrial based on a witness technicality. In 
October 2017, the matter was still pending a retrial de novo 13 years after the initial separation in 
2004. 
Wassertrom 2007: UNAT closes door to independent judicial review  
James Wasserstrom, an American anti-corruption veteran serving in the United Nations Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK), suffered egregious retaliation after reporting a multi-million dollar corruption 
scheme involving UN officials and local companies in Kosovo in 2007.  He sought protection by the 
UN Ethics Office against retaliation under ST/SGB/2005/21 until, on appeal in 2014 (seven years 
after the retaliation), the UN Appeals Tribunal ruled in Wasserstrom 2014/UNAT/457 that a UN staff 
member had no enforceable right to protection, and the UN Dispute Tribunal therefore had no 
jurisdiction to hear a challenge to any decision made by the Ethics Office. 
The UNAT relied on Article 2(1) of the UNDT statute, which limits the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to 
hear a challenge to only an ‘administrative decision’ that is alleged to breach the terms of the staff 
member's employment.  By a majority decision, the UNAT held that ST/SGB/2005/21 section 5.7 
only authorized the Ethics Office to make a recommendation to the Secretary-General. 
Recommendations are not ‘administrative decisions’ and even if the form of the retaliation has a 
serious detrimental effect on the staff member’s employment, decisions made by the Ethics Office 
are not deemed to be subject to judicial review.  This reversed the decision opened the door to 
judicial review in Hunt-Matthes UNDT/2011/63. 
The status quo as of 2014 is that the Ethics Office may recommend that the staff member be 
protected from retaliation. However, the Secretary-General is under no obligation to accept that 
recommendation.  Whistleblower protection in the UN is therefore not an enforceable legal right 
because the staff member has no legal means by which to compel the Organisation to protect them, 
no matter what the findings of the retaliation report might be.  
 
Nguyen-Kropp & Postica (2015): custodians of the investigation function retaliate 
The UN Ethics Office found a prima facie case of retaliation against two OIOS investigators. The 
Acting Director, OIOS/ID had downgraded their respective 2010 performance evaluations when they 
raised legitimate concerns about his tampering with evidence.  As the case involved an OIOS staff 
member, the UN Ethics Office convened an external panel for a full investigation. The applicants 
were denied the right to challenge the appointment of members of the panel or their terms of 
reference, despite concerns that the panel members were not independent.  This Investigation 
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Panel found no evidence of retaliation, though that claim was subsequently contradicted by the UN 
Dispute Tribunal following a hearing in Nguyen-Kropp & Postica (2013/UNDT/176). 
Following the publication of the Nguyen-Kropp & Postica (2013/UNDT/176) judgement in late 
December 2013 in which OIOS/ID  was criticised for initiating an investigation with a retaliatory 
motive, the Investigations Director requested that the persons responsible at least be placed on 
administrative leave. No action was ever taken against any of the retaliators identified. 
 
Artjon Shkurtaj (2007):  UN Ethics Office jurisdiction rejected 
Artjon Shkurtaj, an Albanian Chief Operations Officer of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) 
in North Korea, was fired in 2007 after he reported counterfeit US dollars in the UNDP office safe in 
Pyongyang and their unauthorized use.  Senior management at UNDP unilaterally withdrew 
Shkurtaj’s appointment, and his short-term contract was allowed to expire.  He requested 
protection from retaliation from the UN Ethics Office, and in August 2007 the Ethics Office found a 
prima facie case of retaliation. The UNDT later concurred with this finding. 
In response, UNDP Administrator Kemal Dervis claimed that the UNDP was not subject to either the 
jurisdiction of the Ethics Office or the UN anti-retaliation policy, and would therefore create its own 
policy and Ethics Office:  
Instead of following the procedures established in his new whistleblower policy, however, Dervis 
convened an ad hoc External Independent Investigative Review Panel’ to review the Shkurtaj case. 
Dervis self -selected the panel without consultation and proper terms of reference and included a 
member of a UNDP advisory board (Warah, 2016). 
Shkurtaj challenged that decision in the UNDT and was successful. The UNAT upheld the Ethics 
Office’s decision to award compensation to him, albeit reduced on appeal.  No disciplinary action 
was taken against anyone involved in the corruption that he reported. This case however catalyzed 
the delegation of authority of the Ethics Office function to individual UN funds and programmes in 
2007. 
 
Rahman: Ethics Office recommendations  
Kalilur Rahman challenged the failure to select him for a D-2 post and the decision to return him to 
a retaliatory work environment at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD).  Retaliation was established but the Secretary-General failed to protect him, forcing 
Rahman to appeal to UNDT for its enforcement which was dismissed without a hearing. 
Rahman appealed to the UNAT over the failure of the institution to restore him to the professional 
and financial standing he had prior to making protected disclosures.  UNAT dismissed both appeals 
and affirmed the UNDT’s judgement. (UNAT/2014/453) However, the judges stated that Rahman, 
as a victim of retaliation, was entitled to be informed of the disciplinary measures imposed on the 
persons responsible for the retaliation. 
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Nartey: the UN Ethics Office ignore UNDT order 
Felix Nartey served as a procurement Officer on secondment from the United Nations Office in 
Nairobi as a UN peacekeeper. In this case (UNDT/NBI/2014/051 ), the UNDT had ordered the UN 
Ethics Office to protect the applicant from retaliation following his witness testimony against 
management in a court case. The Ethics Office refused to comply. Judgment No. UNDT/2014/051 
concluded that ‘UNON management abused its authority in [...] denying [Mr. Nartey] the grant of a 
lien on his post to serve as a peacekeeper. The UNDT found that UNON’s general practice of denying 
liens to professional staff going on mission was ‘contrary to the spirit and intent of the Secretary-
General as expressed in ST/AI/404’. Judgment No. UNDT/2014/051 was vacated by UNAT, and the 
referrals of the Director of the Ethics Office and the Director of DAS of UNON to the Secretary-
General for accountability were vacated. The flouting of UN court orders by the UN Ethics Office 
without proper justification does not reinforce culture of accountability. 
 
Kompass 2014: A retaliatory Investigation  
In 2014, Anders Kompass of Sweden was Director of the Field Operations Division in the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Geneva.  In that capacity, he received an 
OHCHR report from the Multi-dimensional Integrated stabilization Mission in the Central African 
Republic (MINUSCA) mission detailing the ongoing sexual abuse of children by French troops.  These 
troops were not under UN command but French command and the UN had no jurisdiction over 
them because they were not deployed as military UN peacekeepers but as an independent French 
force. 
Kompass, whose role involved cooperation with member states, passed the information to the 
French Government.  This action was interpreted by his supervisors as leaking confidential 
information. The Director of the Ethics Office referred the case to OIOS/ID, to have Kompass 
investigated for ‘misconduct.’ The OIOS Investigation Director recused himself from the 
investigation on the basis that he perceived it to be a politically motivated witch-hunt (Inner City 
Press, 2015).  
The ensuing press publicity forced the UN to appoint an external panel to review the case. Their 
report highlighted the influence of UN Chief of Staff Malcorra on Ethics Director Joan Dubinsky and 
the OIOS Chiefs, and found that USG/OIOS Lapointe had acted improperly and abused her 
authority.11 
 
These cases have done little to inspire confidence in future UN whistleblowers in deciding to 
exercise their duty to blow the whistle (Rocha & Kleiner, 2005). Moreover,  the use of power and 
legal resources by the United Nations in litigating these cases raises serious questions (Kipnis, 1981). 
                                                 
11 Ms. Dubinsky retired from the UN very shortly thereafter, but not before Ms. Malcorra extended her contract just long enough 
to give her a significantly increased pension.  
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The United States Congress, however, took important steps to address UN accountability failure in 
relation to whistleblowers in 2014. 
 
Rielly-errors in UN ethics reports - A review of its own errors 
One of the last cases to be reviewed by the UN Ethics Office prior to abolition of the policy was the 
case of Emma Rielly in July 2016.  Ms. Reilly was an employee of the Office of High Commissioner 
for Human Rights who reported protected activities in relation to her supervisor including the 
acceptance of gifts from a government and the compromising of the identity of Chinese dissidents 
to the Chinese Government.  
The UN Ethics Office stated in its decision which took 85 days to deliver, that no prima facie case of 
retaliation existed on the basis that in their opinion Ms. Rielly had endured no retaliation. The 
decision contained numerous errors of fact and law that the UN Ethics Office agreed to review it 
again- a decision was still pending in October 2017. Under the new policy, Ms Rielly will have no 
right of judicial review unless the Ethics Office find a prima facie case of retaliation (Gallo, 2017). 
These cases illustrate that external independent scrutiny of Ethics Office decisions are an 
imperative.  
 
4.3 US CONGRESSIONAL CERTIFICATION INITIATIVES  
 
Section 7048 of The US Appropriations Act 2014 requires that UN agencies funded by the US comply 
with international best practices for the protection of whistleblowers. 
The US State Department was required to certify that each of these bodies complied with these 
standards, failing which 15% of the US contribution to that body would be withheld.  Within six 
months of legislation being passed, the Hunt-Matthes and Wasserstrom judgements illustrated that 
whistleblower protection implementation was flawed, though the budget contribution was not 
withheld.  This certification process is a positive measure to enforce UN accountability and the 
diligent exercise of the certification process will be critical in enforcing UN accountability in future.  
 
4.4 INCREASING EVIDENCE OF PERCEPTION OF BIAS IN THE UN APPEALS TRIBUNAL  
 
The UNDT, with its independent judges, represents a marked improvement over the discredited 
justice system it replaced.  Yet the trend in United Nations Appeal Tribunal judgements continues 
to concern UN staff given the perceived bias against them.  Moreover, there is an automatic right 
of appeal to the UNAT and its judgements are final.  
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Table 1. Statistics from UN Justice System Annual Reports to the General Assembly (Gallo, 2017) 
UNAT JUDGEMENTS  2016 2015 2014 
FOR UN 63 90 73 
FOR UN STAFF 15 16 16 
 
In January 2017, ST/SGB/2005/21 was replaced by ST/SGB/2017/2, but implementation of the new 
policy remains assigned to the same Ethics Office that failed to implement the 2005 policy.  In 
addition, the new policy does not address why staff lack confidence in it.  This is the governance 
equivalent of doing the same thing over and expecting different results. It is futile and shortsighted 
at best. 
In 2017, incoming Secretary-General Antonio Guterres aware of staff concerns stated:  
The United Nations must focus on delivery rather than process; and on people rather than 
bureaucracy. I am committed to building a culture of accountability, strong performance 
management and effective protection for whistleblowers. 
This is not dissimilar to the assurances offered by his predecessor Ban Ki Moon in 2007, who said: 
We must build a staff that is truly mobile, multi-functional and accountable, […] And we must 
hold all UN employees to the highest standards of integrity and ethical behaviour. 
 
4.5 HURDLES FOR FUTURE WHISTLEBLOWERS UNDER THE NEW POLICY ST/SGB/2017/2 
 
The new whistleblower policy, ST/SGB/2017/2 introduced in January 2017, purports to strengthen 
whistleblower protection for UN staff members. How discretion is exercised in its implementation 
is the core issue to determine its effectiveness. 
The criteria for granting whistleblower protection remain unchanged:  the staff member must have 
suffered retaliation after a ‘protected activity,’ which is either (a) reporting misconduct, or (b) having 
co-operated with an investigation or audit. 
The definition of retaliation has been amended to mean  
any direct or indirect detrimental action that adversely affects the employment or working 
conditions of an individual, where such action has been recommended, threatened or taken 
for the purpose of punishing, intimidating or injuring an individual [Emphasis added] because 
that individual engaged in [a ‘protected activity’].  
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This allows the Ethics Office to excuse retaliation on the grounds that management was able to 
provide an alternative motive for the actions taken. These are typically disingenuous performance 
issues and restructuring initiatives designed to abolish the post of the whistleblower. 
This new policy retains the same burden of proof, with the onus remaining on the Organisation to 
demonstrate by ‘clear and convincing evidence’ that they would have taken the same action even 
without the protected activity.  
The ability to probe a case beyond a superficial justification requires a high degree of expertise to 
secure circumstantial evidence in addition to the political will to do so. In 2013, witness evidence 
given under oath by Susan John, former Ethics Officer in Hunt v Matthes UNDT/2013/085 stated 
that an untrained and unpaid intern was delegated the responsibilty of making the decision on 
behalf of the UN Ethics Office in relation to fraudulent documentation produced by the Inspector 
Generals Office. The judgement of the Under Secretary General for Ethics in delegating a case of 
such complexity12 to discern burden of proof to an intern is questionable. 
Moreover, the new policy retains the requirement (section 2.1) that in order to be a ‘protected act’ 
the misconduct complaint must contain ‘information or evidence to support a reasonable belief that 
misconduct has occurred.’  This allows the Ethics Office to make a completely subjective assessment 
as to the adequacy of the grounds for the misconduct complaint, and therefore dismiss the 
application. Such decisions are still excluded from judicial review. 
Between 2006-2016, 96 per cent of applications for protection were summarily rejected without 
further investigation at the ‘preliminary review’ stage.  The staff member cannot challenge the 
preliminary review decision. Moreover, ST/SGB/2017/2 Section 8.4 allows the Ethics Office to 
dismiss an application for protection against retaliation after an OIOS investigation found there was 
retaliation. That section authorizes the Ethics Office to then conduct a further ‘independent review’ 
assessing the motives for the retaliation, and thus dismiss the application at that stage – again 
without staff member having the right to challenge it. 
Access to necessary evidence such as management communications or other documents without 
an Order from the Tribunal is problematic for staff. Prima facie evidence of its existence is required. 
Even when such an order is granted, there is a history of the UN Administration failing to disclose 
documents, again leaving the staff member with no admissible evidence. For example, the 
confidential UNHCR Lack Hill and Langford Report of 2007 commissioned by the UNHCR High 
Commissioner and independently verified irregularities in the UNCHR IGO reported by the 
whistleblower was unknown to the applicant for a decade. 
Much has been made of the shortened time limits under ST/SGB/2017/2 for the Ethics Office to 
exercise its discretion. ST/SGB/2005/21 had required a decision to be made within 45 days from 
receiving the complaint of retaliation.  This has now been ‘shortened’ to 30 days - but within 30 days 
of receiving all information requested. That is a retrograde step. It allows for the procedure to be 
delayed almost indefinitely. The UN Ethics Office request for more documents effectively  resets the 
                                                 
12 UNAT judges failed to grasp the correct facts in Hunt-Matthes UNAT/2014/444. 
   52 
30-day clock at each juncture.  There is no penalty or sanction for running beyond this time period, 
and the staff member has no right to challenge the Ethics Office failure to act in the specified time 
period.  
The new policy, ST/SGB/2017/2 purports to extend the coverage of the whistleblower protection 
policy to non-staff members and confirms that it is misconduct for a UN staff member to retaliate 
against an outside party. This presents unique implementation challenges as the UN has no legal 
jurisdiction over third parties. 
This is illustrated by two cases involving experienced American police officers serving in UN 
peacekeeping missions but hired by private companies. Both Kathy Bolkovac hired by Dyn Corp USA 
and Tamatha Fischer hired by PAE under contract with the US State Department reported serious 
sexual impropriety by UN personnel in accordance with applicable UN internal channels and were 
not protected from brutal retaliation.  Additionally, Fischer experienced post-employment 
retaliation, received no relief and was subsequently blacklisted.  Bolkovac received relief from a UK 
tribunal in 2002 where Dyn Corps was registered13 (Bolkovac, 2011; Walden, 2014). How protection 
would apply under the new policy is yet to be tested. 
Under the new policy, Section 9 provides for the ‘review’ of the Ethics Office decision by the 
Alternate Chair of the UN Ethics Panel, but the argument that that is somehow ‘independent’ is 
fallacious. The Alternate Chair of the UN Ethics Panel will by definition always be a professional 
colleague of the Ethics Director. Any professional relationship they have could create a conflict of 
interests that prevents them from reviewing the decision of someone they know and work with. 
Furthermore, decisions of the Ethics Panel cannot be reviewed by the UNDT. The lack of access to 
judicial review is the most serious flaw in the system.   
That an administrative decision is contestable under ST/SGB/2017/2 section 10.1 only partially 
closes the loophole that allowed for the dismissal of the application in the Wasserstrom case. Only 
decisions by the Administration are contestable, following a recommendation from the Ethics 
Office. Decisions of the Administration are those instances where retaliation is actually established 
by the Ethics Office, (less than 4% of all applications between 2006-2016). Even then, the decision 
can only be challenged if it has ‘direct legal consequences’ affecting the staff member’s 
employment.  As such, it will only be of any real value if the applicant is still employed by the UN at 
the time such a decision is made. 
According to the August 2017 report to the General Assembly: Activities of the Office of Internal 
Oversight Services for the period 1 July 2016-30 June 2017, the Ethics Office referred 5 cases for 
investigation under the new policy of which one case of retaliation was substantiated. More 
research is required as to how discretion was exercised by the Ethics Office. 
In summary, ST/SGB/2017/2 appears to preserve the Ethics Office ability to dismiss applications for 
protection as staff members still have no right to an independent legal challenge of the decision. In 
                                                 
13 Dyn Corps, UK a subsidiary of Dyn Corps International has since moved its registration to the middle east where employment 
law standards favour the employer.   
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short, this new policy preserves the organization’s tactics for dismissing applications for protection 
(Lewis & Vandekerckhove, 2011). More research will determine the validity of the hypothesis.  
 
4.6 CONCLUSION:  A CULTURE OF SILENCE AND INCREASE IN CORRUPTION 
 
Evidence to date has shown that poor implementation of ST/SGB/2005/21 has created a decade 
long whistleblower protection gap which has paradoxically served to protect unethical and 
retaliatory managers more than staff members reporting in good faith (Rothschild & Miethe, 1999).  
To submit the new policy to implementation by the same mechanisms and to expect a different 
result is shortsighted and does not address UN staff lack of confidence in the implementation 
mechanism.  Evidence garnered from internal staff surveys (UN 2017, UNHCR 2011, UNHCR 2017, 
UNICEF 2017) and ongoing external research (Hunt-Matthes 2017) indicates that instead of 
empowering staff to speak up it may have inadvertently created a ‘culture of silence’ in the face of 
UN corruption (Knoll & Dick, 2013). 
At the launch of ST/SGB/2017/2, the Secretary-General announced the establishment of an ‘Internal 
Working Group’ to monitor progress under this new policy, but failed to look outside the UN system 
for solutions to the lack of independence of its whistleblower protection mechanisms. 
There is, for example, no independent dispute resolution entity, either internally or across the whole 
UN system.   
To be effective, any whistleblower protection mechanism must involve mandatory enforcement of 
its findings. There must be penalties for retaliation, and any act of reprisal for, or interference with, 
a whistleblower’s disclosure should be sanctioned without delay as misconduct. Perpetrators of 
retaliation should be subject to employment/professional sanctions and civil penalties.  
Until then, as the UN JIU Inspectors predicted seven years ago: 
‘Without staff confidence and staff involvement, however, the ethics function will struggle to make 
an impact. It is of paramount importance, therefore, that the ethics function operates 
independently of management’ (Wynes & Zahran, 2010: para 44). 
This protection gap has created a significant management risk within the UN (Ponemon, 1994).  
Whistleblowers constitute the prime source of critical information when it comes to identifying 
fraud and abuse 43% of all fraud is flagged by whistleblowers (KPMG, 2016). When an organization 
decides ‘to shoot the messenger,’ employee morale is detrimentally affected, with grave 
consequences for tackling corruption. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Independence of the UN Ethics function by agency, date of establishment of function 
and indicators of independence – Source JIU report 2010 
Organization  Terms of appointment of head of ethics office  
Reporting to executive 
head  
Reporting to legislative 
bodies  
  Informal  
access to legislative 
bodies  
United Nations  Appointment is not time-limited.  
Reports directly to 
Secretary-General (SG). 
Annual report to SG 
cannot be changed by 
SG.  
SG reports annually to 
General Assembly on 
the activities of the 
Ethics Office.  
No  
UNDP  
Policy: one four-year 
contract, non- 
renewable; ineligible 
for subsequent 
employment in UNDP. 
Practice: one-year 
contract renewable up 
to four years.  
Reports directly to 
Administrator. 
Annual report to 
Administrator cleared 
by United Nations Ethics 
Committee (UNEC) 
which makes 
recommendations as 
appropriate. 
Administrator cannot 
change annual report.  
Ethics Office reports 
annually to Executive 
Board. 
Recommendations of 
UNEC sent to the 
Administrator.  
No  
UNFPA  
Policy: one five-year 
contract, non- 
renewable; ineligible 
for subsequent 
employment in UNFPA. 
Practice: subject to 
current recruitment 
rules.  
Reports directly to 
Executive Director (ED). 
Annual report to ED 
cleared by UNEC which 
makes 
recommendations as 
appropriate. 
ED cannot make 
changes to annual 
report.  
ED annual report to 
Executive Board on 
oversight activities 
includes paragraph on 
ethics and 
recommendations made 
by UNEC.  
No  
UNICEF  
Policy: one five-year 
contract, non- 
renewable; ineligible 
for subsequent 
employment in UNICEF. 
Practice: two-year 
contract renewable up 
to five years.  
Reports directly to the 
Executive Director. 
Annual report to ED 
cleared by UNEC which 
makes 
recommendations as 
appropriate. 
ED cannot make 
changes to annual 
report.  
ED annual report to 
Executive Board 
includes key elements 
of Ethics Office report 
and any 
recommendations made 
by UNEC.  
No  
UNHCR  Appointment is not time-limited.  
Reports directly to High 
Commissioner (HC). 
Annual report to HC 
cleared by UNEC which 
makes 
recommendations as 
appropriate. 
HC cannot make 
changes to annual 
report.  
Ethics Office provides 
courtesy copy of annual 
report to the chair of 
Executive Committee 
and this report is on 
website. Ethics Office 
reports to Executive 
Committee/ Standing 
Committee on 
periodic/ad hoc basis.  
No  
WFP Appointment is not time-limited.  
Reports directly to 
Executive Director. 
Annual report to ED 
cleared by UNEC which 
makes 
recommendations as 
appropriate. 
ED can make changes to 
annual report.  
ED forwards summary of 
the report to Executive 
Board and includes 
recommendations of 
UNEC.  
No  
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ILO  
No separate head of 
ethics office. 
Appointment is not 
time-limited.  
Reports directly to 
Director-General in 
capacity as Ethics 
Officer. 
Presents a periodic 
report to DG.  
No reporting by DG to 
Governing Body on the 
activities of the Ethics 
Officer.  
No  
FAO  Appointment is not time-limited.  
Reports directly to 
Director-General in 
capacity as Ethics 
Officer. 
No information  No  
UNESCO  
Policy: appointment of 
limited duration, with 
maximum duration of 
four years. Practice: 
one year initially with a 
maximum tenure of  
Reports directly to 
Director-General.  No such policy  No  
UPU  
fNoourseypearas.te 
head of ethics office. 
Appointment is not 
time-limited.  
Reports directly to 
Director General of the  
International Bureau in 
capacity as Ethics 
Officer.  
No information  No  
ITU  Appointment is not time-limited.  
Ethics Officer reports 
directly to Secretary 
General. 
Through the SG Office, 
EO updates Council 
working groups, Council 
and Plenipotentiary 
Conference about ethics 
function.  
No  
WMO  
No separate head of 
ethics office. 
Appointment is not 
time-limited.  
Reports to Secretary-
General in capacity as 
Ethics Officer a.i. 
Reports on discharge of 
the ethics function 
through annual 
accountability report to 
SG which cannot be 
changed by SG.  
EO a.i. provides 
periodic information 
about the ethics 
function in progress 
reports to the WMO 
Audit Committee, and 
through the SG to 
Executive 
Council/Congress.  
No  
IMO  Appointment is not time-limited.    No  
WIPO ( June 
2012)  
Appointment is not 
time-limited.  
Reports directly to 
Director-General in 
capacity as Ethics 
Officer. Presents a 
periodic  
No  No  
UNIDO  Appointment is not time limited  
reEpOorrtetpooDrtGs d. 
irectly to the DG  No information  No  
IOM  Appointment is not time limited  
EO reports directly to 
the DG   No  
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5. Enhancing whistleblower protection: ‘it’s all about the culture’ 
 
Stelios Andreadakis 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This chapter argues that, since law and policies do not provide a fully adequate answer to the 
problem of whistleblower protection, we need to reinforce these rules and policies and make them 
more focused on corporate culture. More specifically, whistleblower policies can contribute 
towards the creation of a culture of openness and honesty, as whistleblowing can be not only an 
instrument of good governance but also a manifestation of a more open culture 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In April 2017, Barclays’ chief executive, Jes Staley, was put under investigation by the Financial 
Conduct Authority and the Bank of England for breaking their rules in relation to the treatment of 
whistleblowers. Jes Stanley apologised for attempting to uncover an informant’s identity and John 
McFarlane, Barclays’ Chairman, admitted that that he is personally disappointed that this situation 
does not fit with the bank’s culture and the integrity of its controls. This was another setback for 
Barclays after the reputational damage it suffered following its involvement in the Libor rigging 
scandal.  
It is not the aim of this chapter to evaluate the ethical stance of Barclays or the conduct of its 
executives. However, this story brought to the surface again the issue of whistleblower protection, 
not so much in relation to the existence of whistleblowing procedures and policies in a company, 
but mainly about their integrity, independence and effectiveness in protecting whistleblowers from 
being victimised or retaliated against because they have disclosed concerns. Although in the case of 
Jes Staley and Barclays there was no harassment or blacklisting, because the whistleblower was not 
identified, it is the most recent one in a long list of cases involving attempts to silence, victimise or 
retaliate employees, who tried to follow the whistleblowing procedures. Michael Woodford, 
Cynthia Cooper, Sherron Watkins and Gary Walker are just a few of the whistleblowers who were 
brave enough to step up and, instead of protection, they received contempt, prosecution and 
harassment.   
It is worth mentioning that in many countries around the world there is a legislative framework that 
has been introduced to offer protection to whistleblowers and more and more companies seem to 
respond positively by introducing whistleblower channels and procedures, especially where such 
requirement is included in the Listing Rules of a country’s stock exchange. At the same time, it needs 
to be examined whether these rules and initiatives are sufficient in actually safeguarding 
whistleblowers or encouraging employees to step up and blow the whistle. Although Serbia, Ireland 
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and New Zealand have some enlightened statutory provisions, it cannot be argued that there is 
uniformity and consistency among these legal frameworks in terms of the type of protection 
offered, the oversight and enforcement mechanisms, and the implementation of internal 
procedures. As a result, there is a growing number of cases of retaliation, discrimination, and 
insufficient protection of whistleblowers, while we are far from the establishment of a set of 
minimum standards that would apply internationally. If potential whistleblowers do not feel that 
they will be adequately protected, they are not likely to blow the whistle, for fear of having the same 
treatment as the above -mentioned whistleblowers.  
This chapter argues that, since law and policies do not provide a fully adequate answer to the 
problem of whistleblower protection, we need to reinforce these rules and policies and make them 
more focused on corporate culture. More specifically, whistleblower policies can contribute 
towards the creation of a culture of openness and honesty, as whistleblowing can be not only an 
instrument of good governance but also a manifestation of a more open culture (Committee on 
Standards in Public Life, 2005). Although improvements can and should be made to the existing 
regulatory framework, this framework needs to be benefitted from a culture that actively 
encourages the challenge of inappropriate behaviour at all levels. Embedding the right culture as 
well as the right processes is the key to achieving efficient whistleblower protection. 
 
5.2 WHISTLEBLOWERS AND THE REALITY CHECK 
 
Workers, including directors and members of the management team, feature at the heart of 
whistleblowing regulation, as they are usually the first to identify or to know when something is 
wrong within their company. Their access to information and their inside knowledge of their 
company renders them an extremely valuable asset not only for fraud and mismanagement 
reporting purposes, but also as an early warning and accountability mechanism (Berry, 2004; Miceli 
& Near, 1992). At the same time, the key for successfully tackling the problem of corporate 
mismanagement and corruption is the establishment of strong bonds and sufficient communication 
channels between employees and management. Encouragement and protection are the two main 
pillars upon which an efficient legal framework should be based. Without clear arrangements which 
offer employees safe ways to raise a concern, it is difficult for a company to effectively manage the 
risks it faces. Unless employees have confidence in the arrangements, they are likely to stay silent 
where there is an issue that can negatively affect the company, its stakeholders or the wider public 
interest. Needless to say, such silence denies the company the opportunity to deal with a potentially 
serious problem before it causes real damage. The costs of such a missed opportunity can be great: 
fines, compensation, regulatory investigation, reputational damage, lost jobs, lost profits and even 
lost lives. (Brown et.al, 2014; Vandekerckhove, 2016).  
Since the 1970s, when the term was initially used by activist Ralph Nader as an alternative to 
derogatory terms, such as informant or snitch, numerous attempts have been made to provide a 
comprehensive definition of whistleblowing without great success. For the purposes of our 
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discussion, a whistleblower is ‘a concerned citizen, totally or predominantly motivated by notions 
of public interest, who initiates of his or her own free will, an open disclosure about a significant 
wrongdoing directly perceived in a particular occupational role, to a person or agency capable of 
investigating the complaint and facilitating the correction of the wrongdoing’ (Australian Senate 
Select Committee, 1994). In essence, effectively encouraging employees to disclose any wrongdoing 
is a critical step for discovering fraud and corporate misconduct. Due to the complexity of 
uncovering a financial misconduct, inside information by low or mid-level employees of a company 
would be of valuable assistance. Indeed, employees have an information advantage over external 
gatekeepers because they have more far-reaching knowledge regarding the inner workings of a 
large corporation. Their position as ‘insiders’ in the company could be instrumental in solving the 
inherent information problems of external gatekeepers (Brickey, 2003).   
As a result, whistleblowers are considered an effective source of feedback on managerial 
malpractices, which can bypass difficulties to communication that often exist in large companies 
and effectively provide essential information to persons that have the power to act (Callahan & 
Dworkin, 1992).  Most of the time, blowing the whistle allows external monitors to request and get 
access to information about alleged misconduct and subsequently to involve the authorities (Call et 
al, 2014). Although whistleblowing can be an effective system of internal monitoring and reporting 
based on employee-watchdogs, there are limitations. An employee’s right to freedom of speech and 
disclosure of information can be seen as part of their right to self-development and autonomy, but 
they should be careful not to breach their employer’s right to enjoy the trust and confidence of their 
employees (Barendt, 2007).   
There is always a balancing act to be performed and, provided that there are considerations that 
make the disclosure necessary, such as the protection of public interest, these considerations tip 
the balance in favour of protecting whistleblowers. Of course, it can also be argued that fraud or 
internal irregularities are not directly related to the protection of public interest, but the impact of 
corporate scandals is rather far-reaching and affects different groups of citizens and the public as a 
whole, as history has shown in the cases of Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat and Lehman Brothers. It 
cannot be denied that there is public interest in effective management and the accountability of 
public affairs and private business (Markopolos, 2010). Whistleblowing goes far beyond the narrow 
boundaries of corruption, criminal activity and violations of the law or administrative regulations 
and can include information about abuse of authority, risks to health and safety, risk to the 
environment and cover up of waste of public funds or similar cases of gross mismanagement. 
Therefore, protection should be afforded to whistleblowers because their conduct contributes 
towards the protection of their colleagues as well as the public, the improvement of legislation and 
the proper functioning of a democratic society. The achievement of such goals presupposes a strong 
commitment to the encouragement and the protection of the legitimate interests of those who 
have courageously been willing to come forward with their concerns (Kohn et al, 2004).  
The design of a robust and efficient system of whistleblower regulation has been a real challenge 
for national legislators and there is lack of uniformity as to the methods employed, the choice of 
prevention techniques, motivation tools and enforcement mechanisms internationally. The three 
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main areas which most of the legislative initiatives have in common and are arguably essential in 
the quest for an optimal model of regulation, are whistleblower protection from retaliation 
practices or unfair dismissal, encouragement of potential whistleblowers and finally the filtering and 
evaluation of whistleblower allegations. 
Starting with the third area, it is an onerous task for the authorities to be able to identify credible 
whistleblowers and distinguish them from opportunistic ones. It cannot be expected that all 
individuals are responsible and non-opportunistic, but baseless or unsubstantiated reports can 
unfairly damage the reputation of innocent parties. It is important that emphasis is put on punishing 
frivolous and vexatious reporting, otherwise credible whistleblowers are likely to slip through the 
cracks, particularly given the limited resources available. Just as whistleblowers’ actions may be 
complex, variably motivated, ambiguous and contested, so too can be the responses of those in 
authority (within and outside a company) when confronted with new information and there is a 
pressing demand for action.  
Despite the difficulties in filtering and evaluating whistleblower credibility, the value of 
whistleblowing as a crime detection and accountability mechanism cannot be underestimated. 
According to the 2016 ACFE Global Fraud Study in 94.5% of the cases examined the perpetrator took 
some efforts to conceal the fraud (ACFE, 2016). Whistleblowers have enabled regulators in the US 
to successfully obtain additional judgments of more than $22 billion more than would have been 
obtained without their assistance, while the total amount of penalties imposed within the period 
from 1978 to 2016 exceeds $85 billion (Call et al, 2014; SEC, 2016).  In addition, tips were found to 
be the most common detection method by a wide margin, accounting for 39.1% of cases (43,3% in 
2014), as opposed to outside monitors (ACFE, 2016). Being part of the company and having easier 
access to insider information is a determining factor for the exposure of cases of misconduct, as 
there is a 15% higher likelihood that corporate financial misconduct comes to light when employees 
are the ones who blow the whistle (Dyck et al, 2010).  
Externals, such as auditors, regulators or institutional investors, closely monitor the company’s 
performance and behaviour, but the growing complexity of modern corporations in combination 
with the limited and restricted access of publicly available information can make it difficult for 
stakeholders to identify financial misconduct (Hobson et al, 2012). On the other hand, employees 
have easier access to insider or sensitive information, but they lack the ability to enforce appropriate 
reporting behaviour or to directly levy penalties against their company. Most of the time, blowing 
the whistle allows external parties to request and get access to information about an alleged 
misconduct and to involve the authorities (Zingales, 2004).  For the SEC, the whistleblower program 
is one of ‘the most powerful weapons in [its]…enforcement arsenal’, as it helps ‘identify possible 
fraud and other violations much earlier than might otherwise have been possible’ (Karpof et. al, 
2008). Therefore, in countries, such as the US, there is a long tradition of promoting whistleblower 
activity as an accountability mechanism complimentary to the operation of external monitors on 
financial reporting activities. The False Claims Act in 1863 stipulated that individuals not affiliated 
with the government who initiate or file actions against federal contractors claiming fraud against 
the government, will be rewarded with a percentage between 10% and 30% of any award or 
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settlement amount. Similar incentives can also be found in the more recent Dodd-Frank Act 2010 
for whistleblowers who voluntarily provided original information to the SEC that led to the 
successful enforcement of an action resulting in monetary sanctions exceeding $1 million (15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-6(b)).14 
This is related to the second important element of whistleblower regulation: the encouragement 
and motivation of potential whistleblowers. Workers often possess private information about 
wrongdoing in their company and who may be responsible for these (Yu, 2008).  Encouraging them 
to bring to attention this valuable information would be the most efficient and cost-effective way 
for companies to stop, mitigate the effect or prevent wrongdoing. As such, internal whistleblowing 
could be seen as a blessing in disguise for companies and society as a whole, because it  brings to 
the surface corporate misconduct that can harm corporate and social welfare, but companies get 
the opportunity to deal with them without the involvement of the authorities and the negative 
publicity (Labaton Sucharow, 2012, 2013).   
It is worth noting here that encouraging and rewarding whistleblowers is as challenging as ensuring 
their protection under any circumstances. There is an ongoing debate in the US and in Europe about 
the proper incentives and, as will be discussed in the next section, the use of financial rewards. Some 
whistleblowers have indicated that moral preferences, rather than financial incentives, drive their 
decision to report (Miceli et al, 2008). Moral motivation is an important determinant of whether an 
employee blows the whistle or remains silent and thus knowing more about the factors that 
moderate this relationship can help companies to design a better incentive strategy to achieve their 
goal of encouraging internal reporting. At the same time, it has also been shown that personal 
morality could influence whistleblowing decisions less when employers offer financial incentives to 
employees for blowing the whistle.  Irrespective of their motivation, according to a 2011 survey, 
99.5% of self-identified whistleblowers said they blew the whistle because they thought it was the 
‘right thing to do’ (Bowles & Polania-Reyes, 2012).   
Although whistleblowers perceive their actions as legitimate and necessary either from an ethical 
or a corporate governance perspective, they need to feel safe from any retaliation practices. 74% of 
employees, who felt that they could question the decisions of management without fear of 
retaliation, went ahead and raised their concerns, but only 51% of those, who feared retaliation, 
reported (Ethics Resource Center, 2012).   
The term ‘retaliation’ should be widely construed and cover any action related to public humiliation, 
harassment, discrimination, threat, demotion, reprisal, punishment, retribution, blacklisting, 
suspension, and dismissal. In the UK, the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (s. 47B) makes explicit 
reference to the right of a worker not to be subjected to any detriment by any act, or any deliberate 
failure to act, by his or her employer done on the ground that the worker has made a protected 
disclosure. If, for example, an employee is dismissed in connection with their protected disclosure, 
                                                 
14 It is worth noting that the Sarbannes-Oxley Act 2002 (SoX)’s provisions were aimed at encouraging corporate whistleblowers but 
not through financial incentives. SoX reflects an attempt to offer enhanced protection to whistleblowers from employer retaliation 
after they disclose wrongdoing and to provide employees with a standardized channel to report organizational misconduct 
internally. See Moberly (2006) 
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such dismissal is automatically unfair. Companies should be prepared to show zero tolerance of 
retaliatory practices of any kind against whistleblowers and such practices should grounds for 
disciplinary action. No whistleblower legislation should allow exceptions, because lack of full 
support to whistleblowers would mean covering up and fostering misconduct and wrongdoing. The 
overarching aim of companies and legislators should be to promote a culture where honest 
disclosures are respected, valued, and even rewarded (Frey & Jegen, 2001).  
A further problem in relation to the phenomenon of retaliation against whistleblowers is the 
difficulty of proving that they were actually retaliated against as their companies could claim that 
the measures in question, including dismissal, blocked career progression or disciplinary were taken 
due to performance-related reasons and not in retaliation for whistleblowing. In the UK, there are 
different burdens of proof on the plaintiff depending on whether or not they seek to bring a claim 
for unfair dismissal or because they have suffered a detriment. At the same time, this diversity in 
relation to the burdens of proof work against a whistleblower, because it creates confusion, makes 
the law less accessible to whistleblowers, and of course more expensive and time consuming 
(Blueprint for Free Speech, 2016). 
Surveys in the US and Australia in the 1990s returned disappointing results as to the companies’ 
attitude towards whistleblowers, as in the US almost 90% of these employees ultimately lost their 
jobs or were demoted, while there were lawsuits initiated against 27% of them (McMillan, 1990).  
In Australia, 20% were dismissed and 14% were demoted; 14% were transferred (to another town, 
not just within the department); 43% were pressured to resign; and 9% had their position abolished. 
Such high percentages serve as evidence of a certain pattern of behaviour through which companies 
were sending a clear message to potential whistleblowers that the response will be crushing in 
intensity (Lennane, 2012). It is positive that recommendations have been included in international 
good practice documents15 to reverse the burden of proof. However, it remains to be seen whether 
these recommendations will be translated to legislative provisions and to what extent they will bring 
a positive change. This is another area where law should aim at changing the existing culture, 
because, even when the whistleblower employee remains in the company, the variety of informal 
retaliation tactics is remarkable, including isolation, removal of normal work, inspections, repeated 
threats of disciplinary action and referral for psychiatric assessment/treatment (Bjørkelo, 2013; 
McDonald & Ahern, 2002). One consequence of publicizing stories about retaliation might be that 
less corporate executives or employees would be tempted to become whistleblowers. Even those 
employees, who are ethically driven and thus feel that they have no choice but to step up and speak, 
may still think about it twice  
As has become apparent, whistleblowers are not adequately protected and the perception that the 
existing legislative framework is effective is far from accurate. What is clear and needs to be 
underlined is that there are a few pieces missing to complete the jigsaw of whistleblower regulation 
                                                 
15 See, among others, OECD, ‘Committing to Effective Whistleblower Protection’, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2016, G20 Anti-
Corruption Action Plan, ‘Protection of Whistleblowers - Study on Whistleblower Protection Frameworks, Compendium of Best 
Practices and Guiding Principles for Legislation’, 2012, Council of Europe, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, ‘The 
protection of ‘whistle-blowers’’, Doc. 12006, 2009 and Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Protection of ‘whistle-blowers’’ 
Resolution 1729, 2010. 
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and these pieces are not concerned with the letter but with the spirit of the law. We need to nurture 
a culture of ethics, not just a culture of compliance. Embedding a culture of continuous 
improvement in ensuring transparency, accountability and openness, instead of a culture of silence, 
in combination with a set of robust processes, can be the key to unlock the riddle of efficient 
whistleblower protection and minimise retaliation, fear and oppression. 
 
5.3 CAN CULTURE BE THE ANSWER? 
 
Creating the right organisational environment where voices can be aired and effective action can be 
taken will remain a daunting task, as long as whistleblowing is not seen as an integral part of the 
wider organisational setting, but as something somehow separate and different, a ‘bolt on’ addition 
(Mannion & Davies, 2015). Whistleblowing is undeniably a means for maintaining integrity, 
protecting interests, influencing justice, and righting wrongs without necessarily the fear of public 
embarrassment, government scrutiny, fines, and litigation. However, more effort is required for 
whistleblowing to become a default accountability mechanism for all companies and achieve its 
purpose. This process has to start from within the companies. ‘Regulators are not able, and should 
not try, to determine the culture of firms. They cannot write a regulatory rule that settles culture. 
Rather, it is the product of many things, which regulators can influence, but much more directly 
which firms themselves can shape’ (Bailey, 2016). Regulators can point towards the right direction 
and require companies to nurture an appropriate culture. Integrity is evidenced by the ethical 
behaviour of all corporate stakeholders, including employees, managers and regulatory authorities. 
The legislation will indicate what is the moral and ethical path that companies should be following 
and then companies will have to show their commitment by creating an ethical culture. Such culture 
is a macro level of ethical consideration having developed from the micro level of personal integrity 
and ethical behaviour (Predmore et al, 2018). 
There is much written about the importance of setting ‘the tone from the top’ (Laasch & Conaway, 
2015; Schwartz et al, 2005). It is the responsibility of management to inspire their employees using 
a collection of shared values and a common mindset based on integrity, fairness and ‘doing the right 
thing’. It is not simple to set an example and promote ethical conduct, because it rests upon the 
willingness of people throughout the organisation to adopt and adhere to that tone from the top. 
Operating in an ‘ethical culture’ is far from a mere box-ticking exercise; it requires commitment and 
emphasis to the effective implementation (Awrey et al, 2013; Kaptein, 2009). Having the right 
organisational rules and controls in place is necessary, but they alone are insufficient, unless they 
are embodied within a vibrant ethical culture and a community of trust. Sometimes rules may not 
connect with the company’s culture or align with its operations, they may intimidate rather than 
inspire employees or they may be detached from business reality. In this case, they do not 
meaningfully convey a ‘tone at the top’, unless those at the top of the organization show leadership 
on this issue and ensure that the message that it is accepted and acceptable to raise a 
whistleblowing concern is promoted regularly (BSI Code of Practice, 2008). 
   67 
Rules do not exist in a vacuum and the environment where the rules operate is as important as the 
rules themselves. There will always be a gap between the ‘letter’ of the law and the norms of society 
in any legislation which aims to change or regulate human behaviour (Ashton, 2015). Companies 
should step in at this point and build a bridge that would allow employees to cross the Rubicon and 
blow the whistle, if they come across potential illegality or significant risks to their companies. A 
recent empirical project in the UK showed that some 83% of respondents blow the whistle at least 
once but mostly internally compared to 15% raising their concerns externally. This is encouraging, 
as it shows that the government has managed to convey to the business community the message 
about the significance of relying on internal reporting. However, the next findings support the 
assumption that the real problem is not the rules, but within the companies themselves. 75% of the 
respondents maintained that nothing was done about the wrongdoing, with 65% receiving no 
response from management, while the most likely response was demotion and dismissals (PCAW & 
University of Greenwich, 2014). 
The focus should be on the culture and not solely on the rules for one additional reason. Research 
on whistleblowing in many jurisdictions consistently shows that one of the main reasons for not 
reporting concerns is that whistleblowers do not believe that it will make a difference. In fact, 
American surveys of federal employees repeatedly found that the fear of retaliation is only the 
second reason why some half a million employees choose not to blow the whistle. The primary 
reason is that they do ‘not think that anything would be done to correct the activity’ (Devine, 2004; 
Lewis et al, 2017). According to the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), this perception 
does not reflect reality, because tips were the source of information for more than 40% of reported 
instances of occupational fraud. The SEC confirms this approach, stating that ‘even if a 
whistleblower’s tip does not cause an investigation to be opened, it may still help lead to a successful 
enforcement action if the whistleblower provides additional information that substantially 
contributes to an ongoing or active investigation’ (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2012). 
In the Francis Report (Freedom to Speak Up, 2015), the term ‘culture’ appears 294 times. 
Apparently, culture has become a buzzword and this is positive, because this is what e all the 
attempts and initiatives should focus on: how to shape a company’s culture and how to combine 
law and culture in a sustainable way. The answer is not easy, because culture is really deep-rooted. 
Cultural values are often so internalised that they are unspoken; they are communicated pervasively 
and absorbed by osmosis rather than by bold statements of organisational ethics and values. The 
initiative for the shaping (or the changing) of a company’s culture comes from the top but for the 
changes to take effect they must occur throughout the company. To effectively change the culture, 
it is not enough to communicate values verbally, but ensure that everybody within the company 
‘lives’ them; in other words, everybody demonstrates their commitment to a particular set of values 
and behaviours and equally expects others to follow suit (Miller, 2017).  
Changing the mind-set is a really difficult undertaking and it takes time and strong will. Instead of 
reproducing the same general recommendations that led to the creation of ineffective paper 
policies, which allow companies to do just the minimum amount required in order to comply with 
the law, this chapter puts forward a more practical solution for both US and UK. A suggestion that 
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aims at using legislation together with corporate culture with view to achieve stronger protection 
to whistleblowers. 
 
5.4 AN EXAMPLE TO FOLLOW? 
 
A provision based on section 7 of the UK Bribery Act 2010 should be added in the existing set of 
rules. Section 7 of the Bribery Act 2010 introduces a new offence by a commercial organisation to 
prevent a bribe being paid to obtain or retain business or a business advantage.16 The available 
defence for a company, should an offence be committed, is to prove that it has adequate procedures 
in place to prevent bribery. Section 7 basically shifts the burden of proof away from the authorities 
towards the core of the problem, the companies themselves. 
The example of the Bribery Act was chosen for a variety of reasons. First of all, it was recently 
introduced in the UK to update and enhance UK law on bribery, a burning issue with international 
implications that is closely related to corruption, the same as whistleblowing. Secondly, the 2010 
Act represents an example of national law inspired by international initiatives and standards, more 
specifically the 1997 OECD anti-bribery Convention. Thirdly, it has received positive comments and 
it is regarded as being among the strictest legislation internationally, not only in terms of penalties, 
but notably because it introduces a new strict liability offence for companies which are failing to 
prevent bribery.  
A similar approach, if adopted in the context of whistleblower protection, would effectively kill two 
birds with one stone. On the one hand, companies will not be able to hide behind their commitment 
to fight corruption and encourage internal whistleblowing; they would have to provide apt evidence, 
not empty promises, that they have strong, up-to-date and effective policies and systems. On the 
other hand, the whistleblowers themselves will eventually stop being side-lined or seen as liabilities, 
but they will have to be integral parts of their companies’ anti-corruption and whistleblower 
protection strategy.  
The rationale behind the introduction of a section 7-type rule is not to unduly burden companies 
with another box-ticking exercise, but to target individuals who treat whistleblowers as ‘snitches, 
troublemakers and backstabbers’ (Campbell, 2013). It also fits well with the existing legislative 
framework and, more specifically, section 47B (1D) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, which allows 
an employer to avoid vicarious liability if it took reasonably practicable steps to prevent workers 
retaliating against whistleblowers. This requirement goes beyond mere compliance with the law. 
Companies will be expected to send a strong message to their employees and stakeholders that the 
                                                 
16 Failure of commercial organisations to prevent bribery 
(1) A relevant commercial organisation (C) is guilty of an offence under this section if a person (A) associated with C bribes another 
person intending—  
(a)to obtain or retain business for C, or  
(b) to obtain or retain an advantage in the conduct of business for C.  
(2) But it is a defence for C to prove that C had in place adequate procedures designed to prevent persons associated with C from 
undertaking such conduct 
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company is built on ethical foundations and is truly committed to promote a culture of openness, 
with whistleblowing protection being one of the key components.  
It will be the responsibility of the senior management and the board of directors, i.e. the typical 
offenders in most whistleblowing cases, to ensure that all internal and external actors are aware of 
and familiar with the relevant policy and commitment to establishing a new culture, and the 
consequences of breaching the policy. In this way, companies of all sizes will have the opportunity 
to design and implement a ‘zero tolerance’ policy against mistreatment of whistleblowers 
throughout their operations over and above inadequate box-ticking systems not supported by a 
suitable corporate culture and values deeply embedded in the company (Whipp, 1989). The 
question of adequacy of internal procedures will ultimately depend on the facts of each case, as 
consideration needs to be given to a number of relevant factors, such as the company’s previous 
conduct and the seriousness of mistreatment. 
In addition, emphasis must be given to the effective implementation of these policies. Companies 
may believe they have been effectively implementing their policies, but it is easy to be over-
confident about this. Therefore, it is of paramount importance to ensure that the board, 
management, agents, employees and stakeholders understand the requirements of the policy and 
that there are adequate internal controls to monitor its implementation. A robust ‘checks and 
balances’ system involves a two-tier arrangement: a) proper documentation and filing of the 
concerns raised, their handling and the outcomes and b) periodic reports to senior management 
and possibly the board on the issues raised, the actions taken and the promptness with which 
inquiries were dealt (Transparency International, 2010). 
Finally, effective training should be implemented providing details of how to raise concerns, the 
available channels and procedures, how people will be protected and how they will be kept 
informed of the outcome of the process. At the same time, training should be should be given to 
senior management on how to deal with disclosures effectively, how to operate whistleblower 
‘hotlines’ and other channels and how to communicate the whistleblower policy as part of the 
company’s culture. Communication through posters, newsletters, periodic training sessions, staff 
orientation, ethics and compliance communications, refresher speeches from senior management, 
staff surveys and awareness tests is of key importance. Gradually, people will develop a sense of 
trust to the company’s senior management and a feeling of confidence in the integrity, 
independence and effectiveness of the company’s whistleblowing procedures. 
The main objective of adding such a requirement to the existing legislation is not to penalise and 
harm the reputation of well-established and successful corporations that experience an isolated 
incident involving allegations for mistreatment of a whistleblower. A full defence will be provided, 
recognising the fact that no regulatory regime will be capable of eradicating certain behaviours at 
all times. Additionally, a defence should also be available so that companies are encouraged to set 
up the right mechanisms for supporting internal whistleblowing and protecting whistleblowers 
against any illegal or unethical action. Good whistleblowing arrangements send a clear message that 
if employees have a concern, the company encourages them to raise it through the available 
channels and procedures. The message should be that it is safe and acceptable to raise a concern 
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and that disclosures will be heard, assessed and dealt with appropriately. Openness is the safest 
strategy and employee confidence in the integrity of the arrangements underpin and demonstrate 
a company’s commitment to strengthening its organisational ethos (O'Brien, 2010). The onus rests 
primarily on the shoulders of directors and managers, who need to show leadership and pave the 
way for the creation of an environment where employees feel safe to raise concerns, where there 
is greater accountability of managers and leaders (when necessary) and where disciplinary action is 
taken against individuals, who are found to have mistreated employees who have raised concerns 
or have blown the whistle. 
Employees can be reluctant to speak up and raise concerns for fear of being discriminated against, 
disbelieved, bullied, seen as disloyal or disrespectful, and for fear that blowing the whistle will 
negatively affect their career progression or their future in the company. Such mentality can only 
be removed when there are proper protection mechanisms in place as well as examples that these 
mechanisms are in fact working properly. For instance, in the UK and US health sector there have 
been several initiatives to encourage whistleblowing (‘Stop the Line’, ‘If in doubt speak out’ or ‘Don’t 
walk by’). These attempts have significantly contributed in raising awareness, but they must be 
supplemented by additional initiatives with view to normalising the raising of concerns.  
Normalisation cannot be achieved by process and procedure alone. Process and procedure need to 
sit within a culture that inspires confidence that raising concerns will be dealt with in an appropriate 
way. If whistleblowers have suddenly been subject to critical appraisals and poor performance 
processes, a negative perception of whistleblowers as ‘troublemakers’ is reinforced, setting back 
attempts to change the culture, while at the same time other employees are deterred from coming 
forward with concerns for fear they too will end up being performance managed. 
Changing the mind-set is a one-way street for achieving effective whistleblower protection. 
Research undertaken by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) showed that the introduction of 
financial incentives for whistleblowers would be unlikely to increase the number of quality 
disclosures made (Financial Conduct Authority and Prudential Regulation Authority, 2014). The 
general feeling is that we need to aim for better protection for all whistleblowers rather than 
financial rewards for a few. The introduction of an additional duty to companies to actively promote 
whistleblowing and to be able to provide evidence if required is the key for this ethical 
transformation to take place. Section 7 of the Bribery Act 2010 can be used as an example and it 
can serve as the missing link in the process of normalisation of whistleblowing and adequate 
safeguarding of whistleblowers’ rights.  
 
5.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Although whistleblower protection has attracted considerable attention and there is increasing 
activity involving the development of whistleblowing policies and regulation at both government 
and corporate level, the existing framework that is in place internationally does not offer sufficient 
assurances to potential whistleblowers. The question with which this chapter deals is how we can 
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ensure that all potential whistleblowers will not be discouraged and will blow the whistle on 
improper activities without the fear of being ignored or retaliated. 
The answer lies in the culture of ethics within a company and industry in general. Such culture should 
determine or at least influence ‘what employees perceive to be the public interest or a matter of 
conscience ahead of the interests of their employing business or institution’ (Lofgren, 1993). 
Employees should not be left on their own fraught with conflicting values, responsibilities, and 
loyalties. They should be allowed to make an informed decision without any pressure or coercion 
from their employers and colleagues. This informed decision should be in line with the business 
culture and the set of values that each company has developed and maintains (Westman, 1991).  
It is of paramount importance that all employees are not only informed about their company’s 
position on whistleblowing or on reporting, but also about the fact that they have a commitment to 
report any wrongdoing they may come across. The basis of their commitment is not merely their 
personal perspective on ethics, but primarily their company’s perspective. This approach does not 
reject altruism and selflessness, which can act as strong incentives for a number of individuals, 
however a further reinforcement of the need to do what is right should be provided. If an ethical 
corporate culture has been established and is deeply embedded in the company, then there is not 
much need for monetary rewards or extra incentives; ‘virtue may be its own reward’ (Callahan & 
Dworkin, 1992).  
Law and corporate culture should be promoted as the most efficient means to provide adequate 
protection to whistleblowers. The law prescribes the procedures to be followed and the safeguards 
in place and companies, along with their management teams, should show that they are really 
committed to applying the law and increasing their employees’ sense of organizational justice. 
Section 7 of the Bribery Act offers an alternative perspective and can be used as a roadmap for 
legislators and authorities around the world to strengthen the existing set of rules and stimulate the 
much-awaited change of culture in relation to transparency, accountability and whistleblowing. 
Such a solution aims at shifting the burden away from the employees, who wish to help their 
company, so that there are no examples where we shot the messenger, overlooking the message 
that is being delivered. At the same time, companies participate actively in this culture shift taking 
reasonable steps to ensure that their staff are informed about the whistleblowing policy, concerns 
can be raised and action will be taken, where necessary, by the corporate managers, and there are 
no instances of whistleblowers being harassed, marginalised or dismissed. Finally, it becomes clear 
that the government and the authorities do not aim at penalising and harming the reputation of 
companies; quite the contrary, companies are given the opportunity to redeem themselves by 
endorsing accountability instead of a culture of introversion and silence. 
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6. Denial and paradox: conundrums of whistleblowing and the need 
for a new style of leadership in health and social care 
 
Angie Ash 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The contradictions of whistleblowing are as follows. First, ignore both the messenger and the 
message. When they don’t give up, go after the messenger – hard – and trash their professional 
reputation. Next, after devastating, life-ending failures of care, spend millions of public money on 
statutory inquiries which, years later, conclude that both messenger and the message had been 
pretty much nailed the problem all along.  
This chapter considers these paradoxes. It argues the need for a different style of leadership in 
health and social care in the UK; leadership which, emphatically and unequivocally, includes political 
as well as organisational leadership, national policy-making and the statutory regulation of these 
services. 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION: BIG ‘EM UP. KNOCK ‘EM DOWN  
 
People who report wrongdoing in the workplace – whistleblowers – may find themselves targets of 
investigation, harassment, intimidation, persecution, and sometimes prosecution. At the same time, 
breathless claims may be made about the heroism of whistleblowers. David Cameron, then UK 
Prime Minister, said in the House of Commons17 ‘[…] we should support whistleblowers and what 
they do to help improve the provision of public services’. Yet the personal opprobrium and damage 
to reputation and career sometimes heaped on a whistleblower suggests that anyone speaking out 
would be ill-advised to expect appreciative accolades from anyone in or outside government. A 
prime minister’s fine words sit uneasily alongside the collateral, lifelong damage to lives, livelihoods, 
relationships, careers and health of those who have spoken out. 
That UK Prime Minister had barely reached his age of majority when Stephen Bolsin became a 
consultant anaesthetist at the Bristol Royal Infirmary (BRI; a hospital in England) in 1988. As soon as 
he took up post, Bolsin was struck by data on the very high mortality rates for children undergoing 
heart surgery there. He raised his concerns many times with senior hospital consultants, the 
Department of Health in England and with the General Medical Council (GMC: the UK regulator of 
medical practitioners). No action was taken. Bolsin took his concerns to the media. This galvanised 
the GMC into action. Professionally marginalised, Dr Bolsin found himself unemployable in the UK: 
he took up medicine in Australia. Thirteen years after Bolsin first raised his concerns, a public inquiry 
chaired by Ian Kennedy concluded that between 30 and 35 children had died unnecessarily, and that 
                                                 
17 In answer to an oral question. Hansard, 24 April 2013, column 882. 
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one-third of children undergoing heart surgery at this Bristol hospital prior to 1995 had had less than 
adequate care. The Kennedy inquiry found Dr Bolsin had been right to persist in raising his concerns. 
Kennedy recommended a new culture of openness in the UK’s national health service (NHS), and a 
non-punitive system for reporting serious incidents (Hammond & Bousfield, 2011; Kennedy Inquiry, 
2001).  
Twelve years after the Kennedy Inquiry published, another public inquiry, this time chaired by 
Robert Francis, considered failures of care in Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust in England. 
Francis reached the very same conclusion as Kennedy: that there was a need for a culture of 
openness in the NHS (Francis Report, 2013). A few months after Francis reported, Dr Stephen Bolsin 
was awarded the Royal College of Anaesthetists’ Medal in recognition of his work to promote safety 
in anaesthesia (PCAW, 2013).  
Such are the contradictions of whistleblowing. First, ignore both the messenger and the message. 
When they don’t give up, go after the messenger – hard – and trash their professional reputation. 
Next, after devastating, life-ending failures of care, spend millions of public money on statutory 
inquiries which, years later, conclude that both messenger and the message had been pretty much 
nailed the problem all along.  
This chapter considers these paradoxes. It argues the need for a different style of leadership in 
health and social care in the UK; leadership which, emphatically and unequivocally, includes political 
as well as organisational leadership, national policy-making and the statutory regulation of these 
services. What follows in is five parts. The next section discusses, firstly, whistleblowing in context, 
purposely situating findings from other scholarship about who whistleblows (and who does not) in 
their situational, organisational culture and climate. Secondly, some of the paradoxes that pervade 
organisational responses – often of denial –  to the whistleblower are considered, and the uneasy 
‘silence’ that can settle on workplaces where wrongdoing is known about, but ceases to be spoken 
about. The thread running through these discussions is that of leadership and the organisational 
culture which, it is argued, can make or break the likelihood of an employee speaking out about 
wrongdoing. Thirdly, the concept of ‘systemic attention deficit disorder’ or ‘SADD’, is proposed, to 
describe an organisational culture and leadership that fails to pay attention to signs of potential 
organisational disaster. The penultimate section offers critique of the ‘romance of the leader’ as 
heroic saviour / cost slayer of organisational and political discourse. The characteristics of this cult 
of leadership and its dangers are identified, developing the concept of the ‘Bathsheba Syndrome’ 
originally put forward by Ludwig and Longenecker (1993). Finally, the antidote to Bathsheba 
syndrome leadership is mapped out. Such ‘Anti-Bathsheba’ leadership models ethical practice, 
thinks critically, listens carefully to whistleblowers, and puts right any wrongdoing, rather than 
punishing the person reporting it. 
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6.2 WHISTLEBLOWING IN CONTEXT  
 
Whistleblowing may be understood as an act of loyalty (or ‘self loyalty’: Arvidson & Axelsson, 2017). 
It is a commitment to doing right, to doing no more harm. It is prosocial behaviour. Little 
distinguishes whistleblowers from non-whistleblowers: you can hardly tell a whistleblower from 
their non-whistleblowing counterpart on any of the usual measures that differentiate employee 
characteristics. Whistleblowers may hold the same attitudes about their workplace, about their job 
and about their managers as those who remained silent. Almost anybody in Brown’s (2008) large-
scale survey of public interest whistleblowing in Australian public sector agencies could be expected 
to speak up and not – as retribution attacks by an organisation on a whistleblower would have us 
believe – only those who were bitter, bore a grudge or were passed over for promotion. And almost 
any employee may stay silent in the face of wrongdoing. Just one characteristic set those who spoke 
out apart from others: their high level of ‘organisational citizenship behaviour’. That is, they cared 
about the organisation and took their role as part of it very seriously (Brown, 2008).  
‘Prosocial’ behaviours (behaviour motivated by altruism as well as self-interest and intended to 
benefit the public or social good), when reinforced and informally normalised in the workplace, are 
more likely to increase whistleblowing activity. Younger and short-tenured employees may be less 
influenced by this prosocial control, suggesting that this is learned and reinforced over time in the 
workplace. When they care about what they do and want to benefit the public or social good, 
employees are more likely to raise concerns about practice. This prosocial behaviour needs an 
environment in which it is cultivated and valued: an organisation that is prosocial, that displays 
citizenship behaviour in what it does, and how it does it (Stansbury & Victor, 2008). Personal and 
situational characteristics interact, but it is contextual variables – the organisation, its culture and 
leadership, relationships of power and authority, peer group pressures – that explain a propensity 
to whistleblow more than individual factors (Near & Miceli, 1996). If managers routinely raise 
concerns –displaying prosocial organisational citizenship behaviour – the likelihood of a new 
employee conforming to this workplace norm increases (Greenberger et al, 1987). Thus 
whistleblowing becomes more likely in organisations that actively support whistleblowing in word 
and deed – where managers walk the talk to tackle wrongdoing and concerns (rather than the 
person raising them).  
Organisations that are perceived to be more fair and ethical by employees are likely to receive more 
whistleblowing reports (Miceli & Near, 2005).  Employees considering whether to report 
wrongdoing are influenced by their perception of their employer’s whistleblowing policies: 
supervisor support for whistleblowing, and workers’ perception of informal policies that support 
external whistleblowing, have been found to be significant predictors of external whistleblowing 
(Sims & Keenan, 1998). An employee is more likely to make a disclosure if they believe their manager 
will back them up; confidence their concerns will be listened to makes it more likely employees will 
voice their concerns (Brown, 2008). These line managers are themselves influenced by the 
organisational culture and milieu they work in: ‘… organisation leaders create an environment of 
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support and encouragement for their employees to speak up and blow the whistle on illegal, 
unethical, or illegitimate activities’ (Sims & Keenan, 1998: 420). 
Thus the wider context counts when it comes to the likelihood an employee will raise concerns. If 
the wrongdoing is sufficiently serious, if it is observed and if the employee thinks that by reporting 
the wrongdoing they can stop it, without suffering personal detriment and harm, they are more 
likely to do so. Employee protection, the right and support to raise concerns, and a workplace 
culture where it is the organisational norm to raise concerns, significantly influence the likelihood 
of reporting. Reporting concerns and getting something done about them, are very hard where 
poor, corrupt or illegal practice is tacitly tolerated (by inaction, or by turning the ‘blind eye’), or 
where whistleblowing procedures feel like an obstacle course designed to fell anyone foolish 
enough to use them. The main reasons for not reporting wrongdoing is the belief that nothing will 
be done, or that the person reporting will suffer reprisal. In other words, that the messenger will be 
shot while the message goes unheeded. Speaking truth to power can be a tough call. 
 
6.3 PARADOX, DENIAL AND SILENCE 
 
To be used and useful, people need to be aware of, understand and have confidence in their 
employer’s whistleblowing procedures, as well as in the people who manage it. It asks a lot of the 
employee fulfilling their side of the employment contract if they find they have to negotiate their 
employer's whistleblowing procedures with all the care of someone picking up a hand grenade. 
When employers regard their whistleblowing policy merely as a box to be ticked to meet 
compliance, regulatory and legal requirements, discouragement or punishment of dissent is 
perceived as the organisational actualité, whatever the policy says.  
Vandekerckhove (2011) set out five paradoxes in the management of whistleblowing. The first is a 
truism – whistleblowing policies work best in organisations that don't really need them. That is to 
say, places where early corrective action is taken about emerging problems. Second, anonymous 
reporting channels for whistleblowers don't always help. Managers may, for example, regard 
anonymous reports as less credible and allocate fewer resources to investigating and rectifying 
reported wrongdoing. Third, rectifying the problem the whistleblower raises may, paradoxically, 
create other problems for the organisation's managers. The stakes are higher if the whistleblowing 
matter threatens the organisation; if it does, whistleblowing is less likely to be effective (Near & 
Miceli, 1995). Fourth, loose talk about the right to blow the whistle, disguises the reality that this is 
an implied or disguised duty. When wrongdoing comes to light, those who knew but did not report 
it are blamed and held accountable, even if they feared reprisal had they raised the concern. In this 
way, a right becomes a liability. Fifth is the paradoxical response to whistleblowing and to the 
employee raising concerns: detriment, reprisal and wrongdoing perpetrated against the employee. 
These paradoxes lie in perfect counter-point: the whistleblower is damned if they do, and damned 
if they don’t. 
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6.3.1 SILENCE AND DENIAL 
 
Between 2005 and 2009, parts of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust in England delivered shockingly 
poor healthcare. Many working in that NHS Trust had raised concerns, only to find themselves 
ignored, marginalised, ostracised or scapegoated by their managers and some colleagues. Most 
simply gave up trying to get anything changed (Francis Report, 2013). One who made a protected 
disclosure under the UK's whistleblowing legislation was Nurse Donnelly. She said she had been 
asked to fabricate patient nursing notes to conceal the number of patients whose length of stay in 
the Accident and Emergency department of Stafford Hospital was breaching the four-hour waiting 
time target. Before making her protected disclosure, Nurse Donnelly sought advice from her Royal 
College of Nursing representative. The advice, which Nurse Donnelly ignored, was that she should 
‘keep her head down’ as there was little that could be done (Francis Report, 2013: 109).  
When employees coordinate work across an organisation they speak to others about the workplace, 
its culture and management. These conversations may well conclude that professional survival 
means keeping quiet about wrongdoing: fear of retaliation is an effective silencer. Just having a 
whistleblowing policy is unlikely to be enough to get people to speak out about wrongdoing: the 
organisational culture and the experience of those working in it are more powerful determinants 
(Keenan, 1990). When an employee conforms to the unspoken organisational ‘rule’ about not 
speaking out, they buy into organisational silence. They are acting precisely in line with an 
organisational culture that has the accessories, but not the action, of speaking out. 
‘Silence’ is non-action or inaction about wrongdoing. Fear of being sanctioned, sidelined or labelled 
a ‘trouble-maker’ (so often code for ‘not-a-team-player’), can keep people quiet and shut down 
debate about what's wrong and what to do about that. Managers may lack skills in giving feedback 
to their superiors or subordinates about shortfalls in practice, quality or safety. Managers may 
obliquely discourage communication about organisational performance up the leadership chain. 
They may do nothing, or dismiss the employee's concerns. ‘Deaf ear syndrome’ (Peirce et al, 1998) 
discourages employees’ direct and open expression of discontent. The primary organisational 
message – whatever its public statements – becomes cost control, target-hitting, and a deadening 
emphasis on consensus by any means necessary.  
 
6.4 CONTAMINATED CULTURES 
 
Contexts to this organisational silence are where its origins, forms and meaning are to be found. 
They are crucial for understanding the meaning and significance of not speaking out (Pinder & 
Harlos, 2001). These contexts embrace power relations, hierarchy, dominance and authority. 
Cultures of injustice may develop, where conflict is suppressed, where job relations are valued over 
human relations, and where competitive individualism dominates workplace behaviour.  
The culture of an organisation and its leadership can, therefore, make or break the likelihood of 
whistleblowing (Ash, 2016). The norms, values, beliefs and behaviours of organisational culture are 
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in dynamic, fluid, social construction. People act in line with these organisational norms, 
conventions and expectations (Warren, 2003). A homogeneous health or social care workforce or 
workplace, staffed by people who share similar beliefs and values, delivering consistency and 
sameness despite the diversity of human need presented to it every day, gradually ceases to honour 
the value of difference, and remains deaf and blind to points of view critical to the ‘business as usual’ 
of the organisation. Bland homogeneity stifles diversity, debate and constructive dissent, and props 
up a workplace culture where speaking out against the norm is imperilled, by covert threats of social 
marginalisation by colleagues or sanction by employers. Organisations where the silence about 
wrongdoing is (another paradox) deafening, share common topography: little or no tolerance of 
dissent; a strong strategic emphasis on cost control; and leadership by people with a background in 
economics or finance. The longer senior managers stay in leadership positions in the same 
organisation, the more alike each other top managers are likely to be (in terms of gender, race, 
wealth, age, core values, difference from main workforce), and the stronger and more embedded 
organisational cultural norms, practices and beliefs surrounding silence and shutting up become 
(Morrison & Milliken, 2000).  
 
6.4.1 CULTIVATING DISASTER 
 
‘Disasters’ in health and social care are often long in the making. Macrae observed that ‘disasters 
are essentially organised events’, which followed systematic and prolonged neglect of warning signs 
and signals of danger, creating ‘deep pockets of organisational ignorance, organisational silence and 
organisational blindness’ (Macrae, 2014a: 441). When problems and risk signs are not acted on, or 
when they are misunderstood, then safeguards and defences against those risks are compromised, 
assuming they were in place at the start.  
Macrae's (2014b) study of ‘close calls’ in aircraft safety, offers an illuminating crossover into health 
and social care. Rather than the shockingly expensive, inexorably delayed, post hoc public inquiries 
in health and social care when things have gone wrong (and had done for some considerable time), 
airline flight safety investigators interrogate flight data, whether mundane or extreme, at all times. 
This expertise demands creative thinking, and capacities to be suspicious, curious and endlessly 
probing. In flight safety, like health or social care, early warning signs can be humdrum and easy to 
miss. Poor hygiene and rough ways of speaking to people using health or social care services are 
signs of slippage which, left unchecked, can spiral into major, life-threatening incidents, such patient 
death from hospital-acquired infections. Disasters develop through sustained and systemic failures 
of practice and attention (Macrae, 2014a). They don’t spontaneously combust as bizarre or 
unfathomable events.   
This slow incubation provides the opportunity in healthcare to take action before disaster occurs – 
but only if attention and resources are mobilised (Macrae, 2014a). This requires, firstly, a hunger – 
the overwhelming drive – to pick up problems and early warnings throughout the organisation (not 
just at the service-delivery end); secondly, effective monitoring systems to pick these up; and, thirdly 
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and critically, the will and capacity to put right, with intelligence and commitment, systemic 
problems that underlie disasters.  
In health and social care, nurses, doctors, social workers and managers on the ground are more 
likely than not to know where the problems and risks are in relation to patient safety and care 
quality. The 2013 Francis Report on Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust recounted many of the 
fears of doctors who knew of problems of care but kept quiet, because they believed that to raise 
these would mean career suicide; or, they feared they would be viewed as complicit in what was 
going on.  
Complaints and patient safety reports were not dealt with properly in parts of the Mid Staffordshire 
NHS Foundation Trust; and were not regarded as providing data of concern for anyone alert to what 
was going on. Whistleblowers were discouraged, and people raising concerns were blamed, bullied 
or marginalised. One of the inquiry’s recommendations was that reporting and information 
collection needed overhaul (Francis Report, 2013). Except the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation 
Trust was overloaded with information, as Kennedy had found a decade before at the BRI. In the 
three months between January and March 2007, the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust had a 
patient safety incident about staffing levels every day (Macrae, 2014a). Staff were not keeping quiet: 
they were raising these reports. But when data aren’t interrogated competently and with a 
detached curiosity, when snippets of information are used to construct a façade of excellence, 
rather than to inform intelligent, thoughtful leadership and management, they become little more 
than costly, useless ornamentation. When daily patient safety incidents are received but passed 
over, when the messenger is blamed for the message, a problem exists. It is systemic, and it is one 
for a leadership that has paid insufficient attention to what is actually going on in their organisation. 
 
6.4.2 SYSTEMIC ATTENTION DEFICIT DISORDER – SADD 
 
This system-wide problem might be called systemic attention deficit disorder, or SADD. Improving 
the capture, analysis and presentation of information on safety and quality cannot be anything other 
than important (Macrae, 2014a). So is being clear that leadership, governance and regulatory 
infrastructures have a mandate to interpret and use information, and not just receive it for 
assessment of potential reputational damage to the organisational window-dressing before moving 
on to the next thing.  
Health and social care staff are used to working in organisations and with systems that are far from 
an ideal type of compassionate care. Time is always squeezed, equipment may be out-dated; 
budgets are cut as demand exceeds capacity. Muddling through and getting by can become survival 
strategies to deliver the service. Imprint this onto the proliferation of governance structures in 
health and social care, surround it with the political turbulence that too often marks free-at-the-
point of delivery national health care in England then, as what happened in Mid Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust illustrated, such conditions incubate disasters. If risks and warnings signs are not 
attended to and recognised for what they are, rot sets in. 
   83 
Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust used information to support its bid to achieve foundation 
trust status. It constructed what materialised as a false narrative of safety and quality that 
discounted the counter-factuals presented by those raising concerns. To monitor and ensure quality 
and safety, the systems, processes and people who operate and work in them, have to pay 
attention, with intention, for data that question and challenge expedient suppositions and 
convenient wisdoms. Assumptions and beliefs about safety and quality of health and social care 
have to be explicit – and continually challenged – within those organisations and by their regulators. 
Early warning signs from staff, disconfirming data and information need interrogation. Paying 
attention and acknowledging ignorance are friends, not foes, of the governance and regulator 
structures (Macrae, 2014a).  
Getting wise and tackling SADD means looking for early warning signs of things going wrong in health 
and social care systems. It means creating leadership and organisational cultures that expect (and 
value) employees speaking out about poor care. It is not an elevated esoteric practice alien to the 
existing capacity of health and social care systems. It doesn't cost money. One of the understandable 
complaints of those criticised in the inevitable inquiries and rapid-fire re-inspections that follow 
disasters in health and social are, is that people knew what was going on, and that they tried to get 
it put right. But this intelligence was painted over with fancy graphs and enticing graphics to 
convince others of the health of the organisation, when embedded information told an entirely 
different story. Warning signs don’t appear in pretty red boxes with ‘Danger!’ stencilled appealingly 
down one side. Warning signs have to be constructed as danger signs; they have to be related to 
pre-existing concerns about potential failure and future harm. Expecting problems, looking out for 
failure, help produce what Macrae (2014a) called the ‘right kind of fear’ – fear motivated by the 
pursuit of quality and safety, not the paralysing dread of the sound of messengers being shot.  It 
takes a particular style of leadership that imprints on an organisation a relentless quest to detect 
and extinguish SADD.  
 
6.5 THE ROMANCE OF THE LEADER 
 
What happens to a whistleblower after they raise their concerns shines a direct spotlight on the 
leadership and culture the organisation.  The calibre of an organisation’s leadership makes a 
difference to its culture, but that is not to set up a leader up as ‘saviour’.  The cult of ‘romancing the 
leader’ describes how leaders are singled out and get headline billing in organisation studies and 
leadership development programmes (Ash, 2016; Meindl et al, 1985). If things go wrong in a health 
or social care organisation, the predictable political response is to search for The New Leader – the 
one who will transform failure into achievement, slash costs, and all within the first year. This is a 
narrative of the heroic figure of myth or fairy tale; the noble slayer of those dragons of corruption. 
Leaders are pivotal influences, for better or for worse, on the organisational culture and people who 
work in it. Leaders influence others to achieve a purpose. Leadership style, character and integrity 
shape how the organisation goes about its business, and how employees experience their work 
(Schaubroeck et al, 2012).  Leaders do this whether or not they are aware of it, by modelling 
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behaviour, by being observed, imitated or identified with by others (Brown et al, 2005). The 
behaviour of an employee's boss is amongst the strongest influences on their own behaviour, more 
so than the employee’s own moral frameworks, or the behaviour of their peers (Schminke et al, 
2002). Leaders and their leadership teams allocate resources and rewards, signalling where 
organisational priorities and interests lie. What leaders give their attention to – in real time, not in 
140-character-soundbites – is observed by those around them. It shapes the climate and culture of 
the organisation and its response to whistleblowers. 
 
6.5.1 RIGHT LEADERSHIP 
 
Right leadership influences an organisation's culture to do the right thing rather than just do things 
right. Ethical leadership has been defined by Brown et al (2005: 120) as ‘the demonstration of 
normatively appropriate conduct through personal actions and interpersonal relationships, and the 
promotion of such conduct to followers through two-way communication reinforcement, and 
decision-making’. That ‘normatively appropriate conduct’ happens in a context: normatively 
appropriate conduct in global finance may be different than that in health and social care, or so we 
might wish.  
The more complex the organisation, sector or entity, the more challenging it is to develop and 
sustain ethical leadership to (Eisenbeiß & Giessner, 2012). Complexity includes the knowledge 
needed to understand the organisational environment and the availability of resources. On this 
basis, the UK NHS and social care operate in ultra-complicated environments. Their humanitarian 
mandate, delivered in an often-hostile political climate of privatisation purporting to pursue 
‘excellence’ (on an ever reducing real-time resource base), and relentless pharmaceutical industry 
profit-making, sets up a cognitive disconnect (Ash, 2013; Festinger, 1962). The dissonance of 
working for the public and social good, in a context of inhumane or destructive behaviour in the 
political sphere, can result in stress, distress and failure. But if ethical leadership, in a political and 
policy context that manifests an ethic of care, acts to deliver the humane goals of the organisation, 
then such negative behaviour stands less chance of gaining traction in health and social care services 
(Ash, 2015).  
 
6.5.2 RIGHT LEADERSHIP IN AN ETHICAL CLIMATE 
 
What a leader pays attention to creates and reinforces organisational culture more so than, say, the 
periodic eruptions that are regulatory inspections of health or social care (Dean, 2014). The ‘ethical 
climate’ of day-to-day organisational life – formal and informal behavioural ways of working, 
authority structures, reward systems, codes of conduct and policies that underpin activity in an 
organisation – set the scene for what behaviour and action are expected of employees (Ash, 2014). 
If employees perceive an organisational climate as benevolent, their commitment to it is greater 
(Cullen et al, 2003). Organisations with ethics codes that are the warp and weft of organisational 
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life, which include demonstrable leadership support and reward systems for ethical behaviour such 
as public organisational accolades, possess effective deterrents to unethical conduct. A workplace 
climate focused to the exclusion of all else on self-interest is most strongly associated with acts of 
unethical behaviour (Kish-Gephart et al, 2010; Treviño et al, 1998). In workplaces with no ethical 
pulse, employees are more likely to adapt to that milieu and those tacit expectations. Employees 
and leaders-in-the-making with a stronger ethical drive to the way they work, will leave. These are 
not positive conditions for expecting, still less encouraging, staff to speak out about poor treatment 
and care. 
 
6.6 ‘BATHSHEBA LEADERSHIP’ AND ITS ANTIDOTE 
 
Developing a health and social care system (that includes politicians and political classes, policy 
makers and regulators) ingrained with an ethic of care calls for – both at its simplest and at its most 
challenging – a change of emphasis from a leader as The Great Person, to a leader as reflective 
human being committed to right action. If leadership is to model ethical behaviour and action, then 
core leadership competencies are the demonstrable capacity to think critically and pay attention to 
information from employees who speak up about wrongdoing, and the leadership ability to take 
responsibility for dealing with the problem, rather than buck-passing, blaming others or embarking 
on a cover-up.  
Leaders of the ‘Great Person’ command-and-control school of leadership, paid wildly more than 
most people they employ whilst shielded from the everyday working life of the people they lead, 
are unlikely ever to experience the needs of the people who use the service. They easily fall prey to 
what Ludwig and Longenecker (1993) called the ‘Bathsheba Syndrome’. The story of Bathsheba and 
King David is found in a number of biblical traditions. By these accounts, David was described as 
having risen rapidly from humble origins to become king of Israel. David was successful, powerful, 
wealthy and influential. But in that very success lay the seeds of his own disgrace. When his generals 
were at battle, instead of leading them, David remained in his palace.  From there, he caught sight 
of a woman bathing – Bathsheba, who was the wife of one his generals. David embarked upon an 
affair with Bathsheba; she became pregnant with his child. David’s many attempts to conceal his 
adultery and paternity of Bathsheba’s baby led to an elaborate cover-up of his own wrongdoing, 
and his arranging the death of Bathsheba’s husband in battle. From being Golden Boy who had all 
the trappings of Great Leader, David descended into deceit, adultery, corruption and self-
preservation, come what may. ‘Bathsheba Syndrome’ describes the dynamics of that descent: 
where rapid success and public acclaim quickly degenerate into hubris and corruption.    
The Great Person leader suffering from Bathsheba Syndrome simply will not get it. The perks and 
privileges they enjoy (whether as politicians, permanent secretaries, chief executives, directors or 
other elevated positions within the system that is publically-funded health and social care), where 
their calls are returned, their emails firewalled, where they command and enjoy resources and 
(lifelong) benefits that are beyond the comprehension of people they are paid to serve, where they 
hold the (false) belief that they can control events, circumstances and people, insulate them from 
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the exigencies, trade-offs and compromises others routinely find themselves making to deliver the 
service the Bathsheba Syndrome leader leads, and about which the whistleblower raises concerns.   
 
6.6.1 ANTI-BATHSHEBA? 
 
Health and social care systems urgently need to expunge the creation of any more leaders of the 
Bathsheba tendency. Instead, the imperative must be to cultivate what we might call ‘Anti-
Bathsheba’ leadership. Anti-Bathsheba leaders, whether they occupy the political, policy-making, 
regulatory or organisational wings of health and social care systems, are those who make sure they 
are surrounded by critical friends in their leadership team: people who are curious, who question 
and use reason, who ask hard questions of hard data, and do so from outside the comfort of 
conventional wisdom and the herd mentality. Anti-Bathsheba finds out, and pays close attention to, 
what employees say; they do not shoot, or arrange for others to shoot, the messenger when they 
are told. Anti-Bathsheba is the leader who regards saying ‘I don’t know’ as a hallmark of thoughtful 
leadership, not ineptitude. Anti-Bathsheba is the antithesis of The Great Person school of leadership 
and its hierarchical organisational cultures that view criticism as disloyalty. In social work, for 
example, Anti-Bathsheba would be concerned that UK social work professionals are, by and large, 
uncritical, that is, unquestioning, of the organisational cultures and structures they practise in 
(Preston-Shoot, 2010). Anti-Bathsheba would understand how such passive docility corrodes 
critical, questioning social work practice.  
Anti-Bathsheba would resist putting themselves and others under prolonged and protracted stress 
and pressure, knowing that stress disinhibits: when people are exhausted, overworked, hungry or 
sleep-deprived, right action and right decision-making take the hit. Long working hours deplete ego 
and cognitive controls on behaviour (Brown & Mitchell, 2010). Anti-Bathsheba is not afraid to call 
out those whose ethical behaviour falls short. They lead organisations where people (inside or 
outside it) have confidence that unethical behaviour will come to light, and be sanctioned when it 
does.  
Anti-Bathsheba would recognise, as research has consistently done, that whistleblowers are not 
vengeful, deranged troublemakers, and instead would understand whistleblowing as a prosocial act. 
Rather than increasing the 21 ways to skin a whistleblower (Bousfield, 2011), Anti-Bathsheba would 
lead from the front to stop reprisals, threats or vexatious complaints to a regulator about the 
whistleblower (three of those 21 ways), and instead would regard whistleblowing as providing a 
constructive internal warning light. Anti-Bathsheba would look first to understand the alleged 
wrongdoing, and then to doing something about the wrongdoing rather than the whistleblower. 
These are leaders who understand that while compliant yes-men and yes-women are superficially 
easier to manage (they always follow the crowd), it's the extraverts with low agreeableness, whose 
first priority is to their profession and people it serves, rather than the bureaucracy that surrounds 
(or stifles) it, are the ones to cultivate in any leadership team and workforce (de Graaf, 2010). Anti-
Bathsheba knows that it is fear of retaliation, and of the consequences of being seen to grass up 
colleagues, that keeps people quiet.  
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6.6.2 ANTI-BATHSHEBA AND LEARNING THOSE LESSONS 
 
Learning, whether from failure or success, is a process. Learning is a practice that needs practice. 
Deep learning is the corrective to an escalation of commitment to harmful action, where the 
intensity of doing the same wrong things over and over again increases after each failure (Sleesman 
et al, 2012). The Anti-Bathsheba leader knows that ‘learning’ isn't a fire shield to be worn only when 
a vicious political firestorm rages and mendacious media are out for blood. Anti-Bathsheba pays 
attention to small deviations from what is expected, whether to the good or the bad, and shapes an 
organisational culture where people develop the skill, and get the practice, of learning.  
Barriers to learning are embedded into the way an organisation goes about its work. There is a 
strong personal and social aversion to being seen to fail, or of acknowledging failure. Being seen as 
successful has huge social cachet for leaders of the old-school Bathsheba Syndrome persuasion. 
Managers have an incentive to distance themselves from failure. Organisational procedures and 
policies, and senior management, can discourage people from trying things out and failing, 
especially when those organisations work in highly politicised environments of health and social 
care that are in perpetual public and, particularly, political gaze. Shared learning is a risky business; 
primitive emotions (fight, flight) emerge and many old school Bathsheba Syndrome leaders aren’t 
able to handle these. People feel negatively when exposing own failures, and may lack the 
competencies so to do that are detachment, dispassionate interest, separation of the self from the 
failure. Carrying out any effective examination of failure requires patience, tolerance of mess, 
uncertainty, and of not knowing. This doesn't fit at all with political demands for action yesterday, 
someone-to-blame, slick answers to superficial questions. It's much more alluring to stay with the 
comfort of self-confirming beliefs (Cannon & Edmondson, 2005). 
If the drive is for learning only from ‘success’, then failure will surely follow (Baumard & Starbuck, 
2005). Anti-Bathsheba would reframe failure as ‘learning’, or ‘practice’, and regard it as an 
inevitable, everyday, to-be-expected part of complex, skilled and demanding human services work. 
Anti-Bathsheba would trade trite tropes like ‘zero tolerance’ and robotic, risk-averse, box-ticking, 
for critical thinking about what is done and why, and asking good questions, probing, interrogating 
and constantly seeking to understand and improve. Anti-Bathsheba wants and expects 
whistleblowers. When they step forward with concerns, Anti-Bathsheba listens very carefully. 
Health and social care services and organisations, and their political and operational leaders, policy-
makers and regulators, should encourage the information that a whistleblower brings. Their focus 
should be on the alleged wrongdoing and how to deal with that, instead of on the person reporting 
it. Cultivating, nurturing and leading organisational cultures where people speak out about poor 
practice before it gets normalised, is the counterbalance to harm and the slippery slope that leads 
to disasters. This is the culture of Anti-Bathsheba leadership in health and social care, where 
whistleblowing is recognised, not as a threat, but as means of ensuring the best possible health and 
social care is provided to people who need it. 
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7. How might trade unions use their voice to engage in the 
whistleblowing process? 
 
Arron P.D. Phillips 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Little is known about whistleblowing in the voice literature and the whistleblowing literature has 
not yet expansively explored the role of trade unions and how they might use voice as a mechanism 
to support whistleblowers.  This chapter seeks to develop the literature that does exist by 
considering six different voice groups that trade unions could use. It then considers how trade 
unions might use these voice options to support whistleblowers make safe and effective disclosures. 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Trade unions and voice go hand in hand. Trade unions speak on behalf of their members, as the 
collective voice is often more effective than an individual voice. Voice mechanisms often provide 
avenues for a representative of a group to speak, rather than allowing each individual member to 
do so. Whistleblowers will use their individual voice to raise concerns that may impact or affect a 
wider group of people within their workplace or wider society. Many whistleblowers face some 
repercussions for doing so; however, the concern may not be dealt with. If the collective voice is 
potentially more effective, it may be that a trade union’s voice would have better outcomes not 
only for the whistleblower but also the concern raised. However, little is known about 
whistleblowing in the voice literature and the whistleblowing literature has not yet expansively 
explored the role of trade unions and how they might use voice as a mechanism to support 
whistleblowers.  This chapter seeks to develop the literature that does exist by considering six 
different voice groups that trade unions could use. It then considers how trade unions might use 
these voice options to support whistleblowers make safe and effective disclosures. This chapter will 
use the standard research definition of whistleblowing by Near and Miceli (1985:4), namely ‘the 
disclosure by organisation members (former or current) of illegal, immoral illegitimate practices 
under the control of their employers, to persons or organisations that may be able to affect action’. 
 
7.2 VOICE LITERATURE  
 
The concept of voice as it is understood today started in the early seventies with Hirshman’s work 
on consumer voice (1970). This was extended into the workplace by Freeman and Medoff, who 
considered employee voice of importance and defined it as 'providing workers as a group with a 
means of communicating with management' (1985:8). The collective nature of this definition led 
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them to conclude that voice was served by unions on behalf of their members. In fact, unions have 
been using their collective voice since the late 1800’s.18 This collective power was a primary motive 
for joining a union. However, more recently, members have a wider set of reasons to join, such as 
individual representation, and legal and financial services. Having said this, union membership in 
the West has declined considerably (Visser, 2006). There are a few exceptions, such as the 
Scandinavian countries that adhere to the Ghent model. Supported by the state, this system 
provides for unemployment funds and some other forms of benefits to be given by the trade unions 
(Kjellberg & Lyhne Ibsen, 2016). To be entitled to access the unemployment fund, membership of 
the union is required, hence the higher unionisation rates in countries that implement such a 
system. A notable exception to union decline, Norway does not subscribe to the Ghent model but 
retains high membership rates. Trade unions, therefore, need to find new avenues to engage and 
show their members and society more broadly that they have value. One such way may be using 
their voice to support whistleblowers.  
Recently, voice has become more individual and about promoting dialogue that is constructive 
(Barry & Wilkinson, 2015: 2; Van Dyne & LePine, 1998: 109). This has led to a division of the 
organisational behaviour, employee relations, and human resources management voice literature. 
The employee relations and human resources management literature has focused on in-role 
behaviours and using direct and indirect channels. These indirect channels are where trade unions 
are considered but whistleblowing is not looked at within this literature. Van Dyne and Lepine (1998) 
do not see whistleblowing as something that is done within one's role and thus it is considered as 
extra-role behaviour. Whistleblowing has, therefore, been left to organisational behaviour 
employee voice literature for discussion. This literature has been structured into two groups, namely 
prosocial voice and justice voice. Van Dyne et al (1995: 247) suggested four types of extra role 
behaviour, two of which were whistleblowing and prosocial. Whilst recognising similarities between 
prosocial and whistleblowing, they favoured a rigid definition where prosocial was helping an 
individual person. The concept of prosocial has since been widened (Morrison, 2011). Therefore, 
whistleblowing has been viewed as justice-related under the organisational behaviour voice 
literature. This classification of whistleblowing in the voice literature is contrary to what is known of 
whistleblowing, namely that, in the majority of cases, it is an internal process which starts with using 
ordinary direct and indirect voice channels (PCAW & University of Greenwich, 2013) and that it 
predominantly is done within a prosocial motive (Dozier & Miceli, 1985; Miceli & Near, 1985). If 
trade unions exist to provide an indirect voice within internal organisation voice mechanisms and 
whistleblowers seek to raise concerns using internal voice channels in the first instance, it is logical 
to suggest that trade unions could potentially have a role to play in the whistleblowing process. 
 
  
                                                 
18 For a critical review of the development of voice and trade union voice up to 1970’s see Kaufmann 2014. 
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7.3 WHISTLEBLOWING AND TRADE UNIONS LITERATURE 
 
The literature on what role trade unions have in the whistleblowing process is sparse. Much of the 
whistleblowing literature has focussed on the whistleblower or legislation. This has sought to 
explore and understand the process whistleblowers go through and the repercussions of making a 
disclosure, with legislation being developed based on the information. However, it has been noted 
that this has come at the cost of ensuring that whistleblowing is effective (Near & Miceli, 1995).  
Effectiveness can be considered as ‘managerial responsiveness to the primary concerns about 
alleged wrongdoing aired by the whistleblower about wrongdoing; and managerial ability or 
willingness to refrain from, or protect the whistleblower against, retaliation or reprisals for having 
aired those concerns’ Vandekerckhove et al (2014:306). Trade unions can have a place within the 
organisation and thus are in a position to assist whistleblowers to not only make a safe disclosure 
but also make sure the disclosure is effective. In Norway, whistleblowing has been regarded as 
successful. This has, to an extent, been put down to the high unionisation rate and the 
institutionalised nature of trade unions in the national system (Skivenes & Trygstad, 2010). 
However, more recently, this success has been questioned (Skivenes & Trygstad, 2013, 2017). 
Research suggests that elsewhere whistleblowers do not see trade unions as a suitable place to 
make the first disclosure. Vandekerckhove (PCAW & University of Greenwich, 2013) found, in an 
analysis of 1000 cases logged via the charity’s advice line, that in only 2% of the 849 cases where a 
disclosure was made, the union was contacted in the first instance. This increased to a maximum of 
5% as the whistleblower made the disclosure on subsequent occasions. Furthermore, in an 
Australian study of public sector whistleblowers, only 1.8% of the 97% internal disclosures engaged 
the trade union (Donkin et al, 2008: 90). However, a study of the NHS in the UK for the Freedom to 
Speak Up Review found that trade unions were the fourth likeliest group to be approached for 
internal advice by Primary Care Workers or second for NHS trust Staff (Lewis et al, 2015). When the 
same groups were asked about making external disclosure, trade unions were the second most likely 
for NHS trust staff and third most likely recipient for primary care workers behind professional 
bodies and regulators. One reason that could be attributed to this lack of whistleblowers engaging 
with trade unions is that trade unions are reluctant to provide resources to an employment dispute 
in which the outcome is not foreseeable. This was highlighted by Vandekerckhove and Rumyantseva 
(2014) who were given this as a reason during an interview with a person who had experience as a 
union representative. 
It has previously been suggested that trade unions could take on a role of supporting whistleblowing 
(Lewis & Vandekerckhove, 2016). They speculate how trade unions could engage in the 
whistleblowing process. The article takes a UK perspective using Vandekerckhove’s (2010) three tier 
model of whistleblowing regulation and Kaine’s (2014) four levels of union voice. The three tier 
model suggests a staged process for whistleblowers to raise a concern, whereby the disclosure is 
made internally on the first occasion.  This means that it is not externalised and the organisation has 
an opportunity to deal with the concern raised. The second tier is to a regulator, so the disclosure 
of information is made outside the organisation but remains restricted. Regulators will have 
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oversight of the organisation and often, but not always, will have the power to require the 
organisation to take action. The third tier is to make a disclosure to the public. Kaine’s four levels of 
union voice are individual, workplace, industry, national and supra-national. She provides some 
examples of methods, such as collective bargaining at workplace industry level and political 
affiliation at the national level.  In their article, Lewis and Vandekerckhove (2016) align these two 
against each other (see Fig 1), recognising that the three-tier model is rather more rigid with fixed 
boundaries, whereas Kaine’s union voice is multi-scaled as she herself points out.  
 
 
 
Lewis and Vandekerckhove (2016) then go on to identify ways that trade unions in the UK could 
engage at the three levels and explore the issues around them. The article, however, does not 
consider the many voice channels that already exist (other than individual representation). These 
voice channels already being in existence mean trade unions may already be integrated or at the 
very least familiar with them requiring less of trade unions in terms of impetus to engage. It is 
suggested that these voice channels can be classified into six groups namely; individual voice; 
collective bargaining; works councils; joint consultation committees; non-union voice; public voice. 
The benefit of creating these six groups as opposed to looking at the many individual voice channels 
is that they have boundaries and can be aligned with Lewis and Vandekerckhove (2016) model. 
Secondly, these groups then become transferable to other countries that might have different voice 
mechanisms or unions engage differently.   
 
7.4 THE SIX GROUPS OF VOICE 
 
Individual voice is any occasion where an individual is caused to use their own voice. In general, this 
will be an employee/worker invoking a designated procedure. In most contexts this will be a 
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grievance procedure; however, it could be other policies, for example, a bullying or a whistleblowing 
policy. In some cases, it will be an individual using their voice in their own defence in disciplinary 
procedures instigated by an employer. However, research suggests that whistleblowers do not 
recognise themselves as a whistleblower until they are told that is what they are (Rothschild & 
Miethe, 1999). Therefore it is possible that whistleblowers will use grievance procedure to raise 
their concern (Lewis & Vandekerckhove, 2015).  Furthermore, a whistleblower may use a grievance 
procedure to disclose retaliation by a manager or peer which results from them making a disclosure. 
Collective bargaining is about negotiating to achieve better working conditions. Collective 
bargaining is predominantly undertaken by trade unions and or national trade union federations. 
As a voice mechanism, it seeks to reach a consensus about minimum standards and or policies 
(Doellgast & Benassi, 2014). These will involve reaching agreement on pay, hours and holiday as a 
minimum but may go further to cover other terms and conditions around physical working 
environment and discipline.  
Works councils within an organisation are institutionalised representative bodies. However, these 
are usually established independently of or against the wishes of management (Nienhuser, 2014). 
The overarching aims of work councils are to represent the employees of the organisation to its 
management (Rogers & Streeck ,1995: 5) although the specific purpose can vary between countries. 
Works councils vary in power and rights. Some countries such as the UK only have a right to 
information, whereas countries such as Germany and the Netherlands have a right to co-
determination and consultation. Norway has a mid-position along with countries like France and 
Luxembourg who only have consultation rights. Whether a trade union has a presence on a works 
council can depend on the country - for example, in Sweden the trade unions act as the works 
council (Nienhuser, 2014: 252). 
Joint Consultation Committees, whilst similar to works councils, can be distinguished on two 
grounds. First, they are created by management and secondly the purpose of them is the exchanging 
of views on matters that fall outside of collective bargaining (Pyman, 2014). Furthermore, they have 
an indirect influence on organisational decision- making (Morishima, 1992). Whilst Joint 
consultation committees are a creature of management they are in some cases supported by law or 
practice, such as in Germany where they are embedded into the national system (Brewster et al, 
2007). Brewster et al (2007) suggest that many joint consultative committees have significant union 
membership and Pyman (2014) suggests this is due to the fact unions were the dominant 
mechanism prior to the creation of joint consultative committees.  In both works councils and joint 
consultation committees union involvement is not guaranteed. However, it has been found that 
where unions are not part of these voice mechanisms there is a positive benefit for employee voice 
and workplace outcomes where the voice mechanism and the union are mutually supportive 
(Brewster et al, 2007; Marchington, 1994). 
Non-union voice mechanisms have increased as trade union membership has decreased (Bryson et 
al, 2013). Non-union employee representation usually occurs in organisations where there is no 
trade union, although in some instances it can occur where there is a trade union but that trade 
union is not entitled or invited to participate in the representation structure. To be a non-union 
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employee representation mechanism, Gollan (in Dobbins & Dundon, 2014: 343) highlights five core 
features. Firstly, it must be restricted to individuals employed by and within the organisation. This 
then limits the role of external organisations such as trade unions. Secondly, he highlights that there 
is likely to be no or very limited links to trade unions or other external representative units. Thirdly, 
it is the firm or organisation that provides resources for the forum to exist. Fourthly, the 
representative body is essentially indirectly providing representative functions rather than more 
direct mechanisms of involvement. Finally, he says that the structures represent all employees at 
the workplace level. Dobbins and Dundon (2014) highlight that these non-union employee 
representation models generally occur in different forms of committees, such as grievance 
committees, joint health and safety and well-being committees or equal opportunity dialogue 
forums. It can also encompass works councils and joint consultative committees where there is no 
union presence or influence. Bryson et al (2013) highlight that these indirect forms of non-union 
voice representation are in decline, whilst more direct channels such as team briefings and problem-
solving groups are on the increase. Dobbins and Dundon (2014) highlight that this literature suggests 
that there are two reasons an employer might engage in non-union employee representation. The 
first is union avoidance i.e. it is a primary objective to avoid an external union involving itself in the 
affairs of the organisation. Gall (2004) suggests that non-union voice mechanisms are often the 
result of an organisation trying to express to its workers that there is no need for union recognition 
within the workplace. Secondly, the alternative is to go beyond union avoidance thus the 
arrangements are set to complement union structures rather than replacing them. Bryson (2004) 
found that direct voice mechanisms and non-union representation together had better managerial 
responsiveness than union voice. However, Bryson (2000) suggested that where unions existed 
direct voice was more effective. 
Public voice is where an individual or group do not use internal voice mechanisms but instead 
choose to go outside the organisation. This can be both at a local or national level. It can be 
considered to be public where the mechanism used does not seek to limit who receives the 
information. The information will be available to the public at large. 
 
7.5 MAPPING AGAINST THE MODEL 
 
Having identified the key elements of these six groups we are now able to identify how they might 
map against the Lewis and Vandekerckhove (2015) model (see Fig 2). At the first tier, the 
requirement was that it was internal within the organisation, individual voice remains within the 
organisation. Works councils and Joint consultation committees are within the organisation and 
thus can be considered at the organisational level.  As mentioned by Kaine (2014) some voice is 
multi-scaled a good example of that is collective bargaining as in some instances it is done at the 
organisational level. However, in some places, it is done externally to the organisation such as 
nationally or industry wide. When collective bargaining is conducted it is not public and is kept 
within a limited group of people. For example, in Norway collective bargaining starts nationally 
between the trade union federations and business federations, therefore, collective bargaining also 
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fits within the regulator level. At the third tier, we have quite clearly public voice. However, we can 
also place non-union voice here in the context of trade unions. As one of the main requirements 
was that it had to be staff, trade unions could not be involved and cannot be considered as part of 
the organisation. Any involvement by the trade union is going to be in an external public capacity.  
 
 
 
7.6 POTENTIAL AVENUES FOR TRADE UNION INVOLVEMENT 
 
Having identified these different voice groups it is now possible to suggest ways that trade unions 
might use these channels to support whistleblowing and whistleblowers more proactively. By 
distinguishing whistleblowing from the whistleblower, trade unions can contribute to creating an 
environment where disclosures are dealt with effectively as well making sure whistleblowers are 
protected from any negative treatment. 
Individual voice provides trade unions with the greatest potential to provide a safe environment for 
whistleblowers to make disclosures. Trade unions can provide advice to their members who wish to 
raise a concern. The union can then help the individual formulate the disclosure in such a way that 
the disclosure is seen by the organisation as a concern rather than a complaint by a disgruntled 
employee. The union can where they have the right to, either through collective bargaining 
agreement or legal right 19, represent the member in any meetings regarding the concern. By 
representing the member the union can ensure that the organisation focus on the concern raised, 
rather than on the motives of the whistleblower. Unions will also be familiar with the organisation's 
                                                 
19 For example in the UK s10 of the employment rights act 1996 permits an in individual to have a trade union official, lay 
representative of the union or a work colleague represent them in grievance or disciplinary proceedings. 
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policies and can make sure that during the process the organisation follows the procedure in place. 
Further, by holding organisations to account in this way, the union may build trust with their 
membership and may see more members coming forward to raise concerns. Another benefit of 
representing individuals is that trade unions will become aware of issues which may affect more of 
their members and when this occurs they will be able to turn it into a collective issue. Making a 
collective issue of a concern raised enables the whistleblower to take a step back and creates an 
additional level of protection for the whistleblower. A collective issue raised by the union is also 
likely to have a greater likelihood of being effectively looked into and resolved. 
Having said this, unions should be cognisant of the fact that whistleblowers will be raising a concern 
generally with a prosocial motive and will want to see the concern rectified. As Lewis and 
Vandekerckhove (2015) point out, the remedy a whistleblower may expect may not be in the wider 
union membership’s interest, and thus unions will need to be careful to approach this potential 
situation with caution. Should a union not deal with it carefully the whistleblower may lose trust in 
the union and believe that the union is colluding with the organisation. This creates the potential of 
a whistleblower making a disclosure to a regulator or the public unnecessarily. A further issue unions 
may face is that a concern is raised by one member which implicates another union member. In 
general, this should not be a problem for unions as they are well versed in representing their 
members and on occasions have to deal with one union member raising a grievance against another. 
However, when this occurs unions should be careful that they do not appear to be picking sides or 
favouring the alleged wrongdoer over the whistleblower. For example by having a lay representative 
support the whistleblower whilst a full-time union official supports the alleged wrongdoer. This has 
the potential for the whistleblower to lose trust in the union.  
Collective bargaining provides trade unions with an ideal opportunity to work with an organisation 
to make sure that whistleblowing is seen as important. Through collectively bargaining, trade unions 
can ensure the policy and procedure both protect the whistleblower and provide mechanisms for 
investigating any concern raised. Lewis (2006) found that where trade unions were engaged in the 
formulation and supported whistleblowing policies these policies were likely to be more influential. 
Trade unions that have a good relationship with the organisation may also try to encourage the 
organisation to include the union as a suitable internal recipient. As an internal recipient, it provides 
whistleblowers with an additional location to make the disclosure. It also potentially provides a safer 
route as the organisation may not be aware of who has made the disclosure to the union. A potential 
benefit to the union is that non-unionised individuals may seek to use the union as a receiver of a 
disclosure. If the whistleblower has a positive experience with the union they may then take up 
membership. Thus, a potential by product of good collective bargaining might be increased 
membership. However, unions must be seen as independent of the organisation. Should a 
whistleblower lack faith in the organisation and then also feel that the union is too close to the 
organisation they may avoid using a well-drafted procedure and find an alternative route to raise 
their concern with all the potential dangers that entails.  
How trade unions engage on work councils will to a significant degree depend on which country 
they are in and the power of the works council. As identified above, works councils will fall into 
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three categories: information, consultation, and co-determination. As works councils are set up 
potentially against the organisation’s wishes, it may be that the employer will only provide the 
minimum rights as necessary to comply with its obligations. It, therefore, requires unions on works 
councils to be assertive. Where a works council is only entitled to information trade unions can have 
two roles. Firstly, where the organisation has a whistleblowing procedure, trade unions can seek 
information on how it is used in practice, what concerns are raised, and how the organisation has 
dealt with them. Through asking these questions trade unions can identify potential issues of wider 
importance to their membership and hold the organisation to account for its implementation of its 
whistleblowing arrangements. Secondly, where no procedure exists trade unions can apply pressure 
to create one by asking for information about issues raised that might fall under such a procedure 
and highlight the benefits of having whistleblowing arrangements.  
Where a works council has consultation rights they can undertake all the aspects of unions that are 
on information only works councils. They can, however, go further and push for a policy and provide 
input into what a policy might contain. Where a works council has co-determination rights a trade 
union can put forward the idea of having a whistleblowing procedure where one is not in existence. 
Where a procedure exists unions can engage in reviewing its effectiveness and push for changes 
where needed and hold the organisation to account.  
Joint consultation committees are as mentioned previously a creation of the organisation. Trade 
unions that are part of these committees can engage in highlighting the need for a whistleblowing 
policy and an effective procedure. By promoting the view that whistleblowing can benefit the 
organisation, trade unions can help organisations realise the need for an effective whistleblowing 
procedure. Where a whistleblowing procedure exists trade unions can use the committee to express 
their view on the effectiveness of it. This will cover both the protection of the whistleblower and 
how the organisation deals with the wrongdoing.  
There may be occasions where trade unions are recognised by the organisation for certain things 
but are not part of the work council or joint consultation committee. Where this occurs trade unions 
should make sure that they are supportive of these voice channels as it will provide better workplace 
outcomes for its members and will have a positive impact on employee voice (Brewster et al,2007; 
Marchington, 1994). Trade unions could also encourage their members to run for election to these 
voice mechanisms. Whilst they will not be recognised as union officials, the union will be able to 
provide support and advice to these members to improve the member’s engagement. Those 
members can potentially undertake the suggestions above as if the union was part of these voice 
mechanisms. The individual could feed this information back to the union, which could, raise a 
collective issue or use other means to get the matter dealt with by the organisation. 
Non-union voice by its very nature means that the union has little to no scope to engage.  However, 
individuals within the organisation might be union members. Where this is the case the union can 
encourage them to put themselves forward as part of the voice mechanisms. Trade unions can then 
support that member through training courses to help them develop their skills. These individuals 
will then be well placed to ask the questions that a union might pose if they had recognition. 
Individuals may then be able to pass significant information back to the union which it can then use 
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in other ways. One example is if the individual highlights a concern that has been raised internally 
but has been ignored. The union could contact the organisation and have a conversation about it. It 
might also apply pressure by alerting the organisation to the public voice options.  
Public voice provides trade unions with a large audience to which they can share information. This 
gives trade unions an opportunity to apply a strong amount of pressure on an organisation. Trade 
unions are external to the organisation that their membership is part of.  Therefore, apart from any 
conditions in a recognition agreement, trade unions owe the organisation little in the way of trust 
or confidentiality. If a trade union is ignored by the organisation it has the ability to make any 
concern public either locally or nationally. Trade unions will have links with media outlets and thus 
are able to refer whistleblowers to appropriate reporters and help them present their story in a way 
that is credible. Trade unions could also make the disclosure to the media on the whistleblower's 
behalf. 
A further opportunity for trade unions in using their public voice is suggested by Lewis and 
Vandekerckhove (2015). They suggest that unions could use their voice to lobby for legislative 
changes. They highlight that unions could pool their expertise to do this. By pooling their expertise 
they could provide real insight into whistleblowing experiences across sectors in both the public and 
private sectors. Trade unions could use this to make sure that any policy or legislative changes are 
effective. Trade unions will have different philosophies and will approach situations with different 
perspectives and objectives. To take into account these differences it may be that national trade 
union federations could play an important role in national lobbying. At international level, the ETUC 
may be a good alternative to individual unions or national federations as they can draw on these 
wider philosophies and make sure national and social systems are considered. In countries where 
trade unions are heavily engaged in the social systems such as the Netherlands, this will be easier 
than those such as the United Kingdom where unions continue to suffer curtailment of their power. 
 
7.7 CONCLUSION 
 
Whistleblowers who speak out will often use internal voice channels in the hope that their concern 
will be heard and rectified. However, many people do not speak out for fear of retaliation. Trade 
unions are organisations with the purpose of securing good employment terms for their members. 
In performing this function, they have a unique position within society, as they are given rights 
within and influence over the organisation. Trade unions, therefore, have the potential to support 
whistleblowers both in terms of making a safe and an effective disclosure. Trade unions being in this 
internal position have the ability to support the whistleblower from the very first stages of raising a 
concern. This is significantly earlier than others, such as solicitors or regulators, who will often 
become involved further down the line when the disclosure has been made and the whistleblower 
has not felt that the concern has been dealt with or has experienced repercussions. 
Little is known to date about how trade unions engage in this process. What we do know does not 
paint a good picture in terms of the trust whistleblowers have in them. Lewis and Vandekerckhove 
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(2015) started to identify ways, in which trade unions could engage in supporting whistleblowers. 
This chapter has sought to develop that by focusing on voice mechanisms that can be identified 
potentially in different countries and employment contexts. These six voice groups suggest different 
ways trade unions could engage in making whistleblowing safer and more effective. It is recognised 
that many of the suggestions are speculative. However, as unions are used to engaging and 
negotiating with organisations, and assisting, advising and training their members what is suggested 
here is not outside of the ordinary work of trade unions.  
In a time when whistleblowing is becoming more frequent and whistleblowing arrangements are 
being recognised as an essential part of good organisational corporate governance, trade unions 
should see whistleblowing as providing a new opportunity for them to engage with both workers 
and wider society. If trade unions engage in a responsive manner, can build trust with 
whistleblowers and become an important actor in the whistleblowing process, they might achieve 
growth both in terms of responsibility and membership. By supporting whistleblowers and using 
various voice mechanisms, trade unions could find that they have a more expansive function within 
society too.  
Many of the potential ways identified above that trade unions could engage with do not require 
much in terms of resources. Trade unions already participate in them, and the most resource-
dependent one of individual representation is a function trade unions already engage with 
significantly. What it does require, though, is for trade unions to see whistleblowing as an 
employment issue and make a concerted effort to actively engage in supporting whistleblowing and 
whistleblowers.   
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